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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
I. Synopsis 
 On September 18, 2011, the Republic of Cyprus began offshore drilling in conjunction 
with Noble Energy (BBC, 2011).  Once the offshore drilling began, events quickly escalated into 
a crisis.  Moments after the announcement was made by the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus granted drilling concessions to the Republic of Turkey.  The 
Turkish government then sent a naval team into the disputed waters (Al Jazeera, 2011).  Turkish 
intervention led to responses by both Israel and Russia.  Israel backed the right of the Republic of 
Cyprus to drill for offshore resources in their Exclusive Economic Zone (or EEZ)
1
 and even 
offered to send their air force to protect the Republic of Cyprus from perceived Turkish threats 
(Jerusalem Post, 2011; Debkafile, 2011).  This has led to harassment between the Turkish navy, 
and the Israeli navy and air force (Debkafile, 2011; Today’s Zaman, 2011a).  Russia entered the 
fray on the side of the Republic of Cyprus.  Russia has sent two submarines to Cyprus and 
dispatched their lone aircraft carrier battle group to support the claims of the Republic of Cyprus 
(Fenwick, 2011; Hurriyet, 2011).  
 It is imperative for political scientists and policy makers to understand the underlying 
issues that resulted in the final alliance configurations.  The formation of these alliances led to
                                                 
1
   The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Russia are signatories to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas 
which delineates the EEZ.  Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Israel are not parties to the 
agreement (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, 1982).  This has made the ownership of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Resources more problematic.  This will be discussed further in the Israel chapter since it impacts 
them the most. 
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the development of the central research question:  What factors are responsible for the formation 
of these alliances and specifically, which of these factors have led to the current alliance of 
nations in the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis?  Examining this question will shed light on why 
states aligned the way they did during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.   By understanding 
these relationships, policy makers and academics will be able to propose policies to mitigate 
conflict escalation.  
A brief survey of the literature is warranted as to what triggered this recent crisis.  The 
trigger is the impact of natural resources on conflict and alliances.  Many scholars have found 
that the presence of natural resources serves as an aggravating force between two hostile actors.  
Especially among resource poor groups, natural resources have led to fierce competition.  
Natural resources have provided the money needed for an actor to modernize or equip its 
fighting force.  The desire for the wealth that comes with natural resources has triggered 
numerous conflicts (Humphreys, 2005; Herbst, 2000; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Le Billon, 
2001; Renner, 2003).  It appears that the drilling undertaken by the Republic of Cyprus has 
geopolitical consequences for the region. 
Alliances are an important factor in the study of conflict.  Scholars have found that 
nations form alliances for the primary reason of security.  Alliances are formed in order to deter 
attack from another hostile country.  This is known as the deterrence effect.  One country will 
not attack another country if that country knows the target country has an array of allies willing 
to fight to defend it (Walt, 1985; Leeds, 2003).  Under the umbrella of alliances, there are many 
different factors that influence the formation of these alliances.  These factors will be 
incorporated as the different hypotheses tested in this study.  These factors are:  ethnic 
similarities, religious similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security.   
  
3 
The first component of alliance formation is similar ethnicity.  This occurs when a 
country intervenes to help another actor that shares the same ethnicity (Davis and Moore, 1997; 
Petersen, 2004).  Traditionally, this intervening to help a kindred ethnic group has been equated 
with irredentist policies.  This occurred in the 1930s when Germany intervened in 
Czechoslovakia to protect the German ethnic group living in the Sudetenland.  In 1979, China 
intervened in Vietnam to protect the interests of the ethnic Chinese residing in that country 
(Ambrosio, 2001; Kornprobst, 2008).  This ethnic component will form one of the factors 
leading to the current alignment of nations during the offshore Cypriot drilling crisis. 
The second component of alliance formation is similar religion.  This term is used to 
denote an alliance between two actors due to a religious commonality.  Usually this is done 
between similar religious factions in order to block the threat of another religion (Lewis, 1998; 
De Juan, 2009).  A country will form an alliance with another group that has similar religious 
beliefs in order to protect the religious liberties of that particular group.  Historical examples 
include the Russians offering protection to their fellow Orthodox Christians in Constantinople in 
the 1800s, or the French offering protection to the Maronite Catholics in Lebanon in the late 
1800s to the early 1900s.  Both of these examples were undertaken by powerful Christian 
majority countries to protect the minority Christians living under Muslim rule (Bugbee, 1877; 
Spagnolo; 1977).  Since this could be the case in this particular instance, the role of religious 
similarities will be studied as a component in this analysis. 
The third component influencing alliance formation is trade, specifically trade in 
hydrocarbons.  There have been studies conducted to see how trade influences alliance 
formation.  The global environment is divided between those who have resources and those who 
are resource poor.  States use their resources to attract other states to their cause.  In return for 
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their support, those resource poor states will gain trade benefits (Long, 2003; Long and Leeds, 
2006; Fordham, 2010; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004).  The impact of 
trade on the formation of alliances will also be included in the analysis.     
The final component influencing alliance formation is security concerns.  This is 
traditionally cited as the main cause for alliance formation.  In this type of alliance, actors join 
together for protection.  The theory is that having a large protection alliance will deter any 
hostile acts from hostile actors.  This type of alliance forms when a state believes they are under 
siege.  That state will seek out other actors to form an alliance in order to offset this fear (Walt, 
1987; Sorokin, 1994a; Rozmer, 2008).  This type of alliance will also play an important part in 
this analysis. 
September 2011 witnessed a crisis off the waters of Cyprus because of the decision of the 
Republic of Cyprus to recover the hydrocarbons in their Exclusive Economic Zone.  Turkey has 
protested this action and has sent a naval squadron to lay claims for Turkish exploration.  The 
crisis has also brought in Great Britain, Russia, and Israel.  In this analysis, the factors that have 
led to the involvement or abstention of countries in the September 2011 Cypriot Crisis will be 
examined.  The components, as previously mentioned are ethnic, religious, hydrocarbon trade, 
and security considerations.  The following sections will go into greater depth on the existing 
literature and how it fits into this project.  A mixed culture/non-culture theory and four 
hypotheses will be proposed to answer the question of what caused the formation of alliances in 
the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.   A qualitative research design will test the theory and 
hypotheses of the analysis.  Finally, the theory will be tested using the cases of Great Britain, 
Greece, Turkey (the traditional players) along with Russia and Israel (the new players).  At the 
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end of this study, it will be clear what factors led certain states to choose a particular side during 
the offshore drilling crisis. 
II. Literature Review 
 Before proceeding to the theoretical section, it is necessary to understand the base 
literature that the theoretical framework is based upon.  There are four areas/traditional theories 
that will examined in this section.  The first area deals with the formation of alliances.  This is 
important to understand why states form alliances and with whom.  The other areas of the 
literature review deal with the current literature working with the factors influencing the 
formation of alliances: ethnic similarities, religious similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security 
concerns.  After reviewing the existing literature, it will be shown how these factors apply to this 
particular puzzle. 
Why Alliances Form 
 Due to the complex nature of this project, it is necessary to define the term “alliances.”  
There are many different definitions in the field of alliances.  These alliances range from treaties 
(i.e. formal alliances) to informal, diplomatic, and military alliances.  For the purposes of this 
study all types of alliances will be included.  Basically if a state asks for assistance and another 
state provides assistance during a crisis, then the action is classified as an alliance.  An alliance is 
present if a state demonstrates that it is threatened by another state and asks for assistance to 
ensure its security (Siverson and Tennefoss, 1984; Skaperdas, 1998; Sprecher and Krause, 2006).  
Due to the importance of the Regional Security Complex Theory to these cases, its contributions 
will be discussed in this section (Buzan, 1991).  The rest of the literature review will focus on the 
four main factors commonly cited as reasons for alliance formation:  similar ethnicity, similar 
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religion, resource trade (specifically trade in hydrocarbons), and security (Chong, et al., 2000; 
Gulati, 1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Sprecher and Krause, 2006).   
Regional Security Complex Theory 
 One theory of alliance formation is particularly useful in this analysis.  That theory is the 
“Regional Security Complex Theory” (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Waever, 2003).  This theory was 
developed in the early 1990s by the Copenhagen school.  The scholars believed that alliances are 
clustered in geographic areas.  The scholars found the reason for this phenomenon was due to the 
geographic feature of distance.  States are more likely to be threatened by the actions of their 
neighbors rather than the actions of some state located across the globe.  This means that other 
states will face a similar threat in the same region.  This leads to the formation of alliances and 
explains their geographical clustering (Buzan, 1991; Lake and Morgan, 1997; Buzan and 
Waever, 2003).  This theory will play a dominant role in justifying the selection of cases later in 
the paper. 
Ethnic Similarity 
 One of the factors cited in the formation of alliances is similar ethnicity.  Before the 
literature is reviewed on this topic, it is important to define ethnicity.  There are numerous 
definitions of ethnicity.  One’s language, religion, and ancestry have all been cited as the basis 
for ethnicity.  For the purposes of this study ethnicity is classified as based on a common 
language and ancestry (Ross, 2007; Huntington, 1997).  For example, a person is defined as a 
Turk because they speak Turkish and are of Turkish ancestry.  The same format is applied to the 
other cases in this study.   
The rise in ethnic conflicts has fueled the literature that looks to the effect of ethnicity on 
alliances (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004).  Ethnic conflict usually 
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occurs at the intrastate level.  Different ethnic groups will compete with each other for control 
over the resources or politics of a country (Horowitz, 1985).  However, this kind of conflict has 
not been contained only to intrastate conflict.  It has been found that if a similar ethnic group is 
divided amongst numerous countries, and that group is attacked by a different ethnic group then 
the kin of the ethnic group attacked even though located in another country, will come to the aid 
of their brothers who have been attacked.  Africa is a prime example of this occurrence.  Rwanda 
has been drawn into conflicts with its neighbors in the course of protecting the Tutsis in 
neighboring states (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004).  
Another term has historically been used to describe a nation states intervening militarily to help 
their ethnic brothers in another country.  The term is irredentism. 
Throughout history there have been many examples of states coming to the aid of other 
states based on a common ethnicity (Chong et al, 2000; Gulati, 1995).  Germany has been 
involved in irredentist policies leading up to the Second World War.  Germany used its military 
might to come to the aid of ethnic Germans who were supposedly mistreated by the French, 
Poles, and the Czechoslovakians (Kornprobst, 2008).  The Chinese intervened militarily against 
Vietnam due to the perception that the Vietnamese were mistreating the Han Chinese minority 
living in Vietnam (Ambrosio, 2001).  It appears that ethnic alliances are in play as nation states 
intervene in the affairs of other states to protect their ethnic kin living in that foreign state. 
This literature dealing with ethnic alliances will prove crucial in showing support for why 
nations aligned the way they did during the Cyprus drilling crisis.  Turkey has been viewed as 
the titular homeland for the Turkish ethnic group.  As a result, Turkey takes a strong interest in 
protecting the rights of Turks.  For some, this ethnic tie between the Turks and the Turkish 
Cypriots explains Turkey’s interventions on the island (Fox, 2001; Landau, 1981).  Greece has 
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also used ethnic ties to intervene in the affairs of Cyprus.  Greece has employed diplomatic 
coercion in mitigating the role Turkey plays on the island, mainly by blocking Turkey’s bid to 
join the European Union.  This action was undertaken because both the Hellenic Republic and 
the majority of the people of the Republic of Cyprus share the same Greek ethnicity 
(Kitromilides, 1990).  The factor of ethnic similarity will be employed later on in the analysis to 
test if ethnic similarities are responsible for the alignment of nations in the Cyprus drilling crisis.  
The next factor examined for alliance formation is the similarity of religions. 
Religious Similarity 
 There has been a debate in the field over the measurement of religion.  How does one 
measure religiosity?  Is it based on the number of times a person prays?  Is it based upon how 
often they attend their mosque, church, or synagogue?  Or perhaps it is measured based on how 
devout the person is in keeping with religious law.  For the purposes of this paper, religion is 
defined as the belief in a certain deity, none of the other factors matter.  The person must identify 
themselves as belonging to either the Christian, Jewish, Islamic, or non-religious groups.  Sects 
have no bearing in this study (Hayden, 1997; Huntington, 1997). 
 This aspect of alliances can be tricky since it has not appeared in the forefront of 
literature dealing with current alliance formation.  If one wants to look at the influence of 
religion on alliance formation, one is usually forced to look at religious examples.  Religion is 
one of the commonalities that can be used to explain alliance formation between states (Hayden, 
1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000).  Common religious beliefs are one of the foundations 
used in forming an alliance.  A state will form an alliance with another state if the first state is of 
the same religion.  For example, Christian states are more likely to join in alliances with other 
Christian states rather than ally with Islamic states.  The same is true of Islamic states (Calbert, 
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2009; Kaplan, 2007; Huntington, 1997).  Now that the theoretical basis has been provided, it is 
necessary to provide examples of this theory occurring in the “real” world. 
 The driving factor behind the theory is to protect the people of similar faith from being 
dominated by adherents of an outside faith.  A religious state will aid a co-religious state (i.e. 
Christian aids Christian, Muslim aids Muslim, etc.) when they are threatened by a state that 
follows a different religion.  This has led some states influenced by religion to claim 
protectorates over alien territory to protect their religious brethren from attack and/or 
exploitation (Bugbee, 1877; Spagnolo, 1977).  There are numerous examples of this kind of 
alliance being used to justify states entering a conflict on one side or another. 
 There are two prime examples of religion playing an important part in alliance formation 
during a conflict.  The first is the Thirty Years War in Europe.  This war occurred as a result of 
the fighting between the Catholics and the Protestants over religious freedom.  The Protestants 
wanted to be able to follow their own version of the Christian faith.  However, the Catholics 
wanted to keep everyone in the Church and suppress what they considered heresy.  The fighting 
centered on the different principalities in Germany.  The Spanish joined the Holy Roman Empire 
in trying to stamp out Protestantism.  Meanwhile, the Protestant Swedes joined the Protestant 
Germans in order to keep them free from the authority of the Catholic Church and the Holy 
Roman monarch (Wedgwood and Grafton, 2005; Steinburg, 1967).  The other example of 
religious similarities playing a role in alliance formation and conflict was more recently the 
Bosnian war.  While religion can not explain the side taken by NATO (i.e. Christians siding with 
Muslims against Christian Serbia), it does explain the alliances between Muslims.  During the 
conflict, Muslims in Chechnya, Iran, and Turkey volunteered to fight with their fellow Muslims 
against the Christian Serbs.  These countries also provided military and economic aid to help the 
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Bosnian Muslims defend their independence movement from the Serbians (Burg and Shoup, 
1999; Shatzmiller, 2002).  Throughout history it appears that religion is a factor that can be 
utilized to explain alliance alignment. 
 From the literature analyzed it appears that religion can be a factor in explaining the 
alignment of nations in their alliances.  What is missing from this literature is how religion plays 
a role in the drilling crisis off Cyprus.  Religious similarities between the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey could account for why Turkey supported North 
Cyprus in this crisis.  There is also a religious similarity between the Republic of Cyprus with 
both Greece and Russia.  In the analysis section, this factor will be tested to see how significant it 
is in explaining alliance patterns.  The next factor that can be used to explain the alignment of 
nations in an alliance is the role of natural resources or hydrocarbons. 
Hydrocarbon Trade 
 Natural resources carry a broad definition.  It can mean anything from timber, to water, to 
wind, to hydrocarbons, etc.  Basically anything that is produced by nature that man can use to 
create energy.  However, such a definition is too broad for the scope of this analysis.  As a result, 
a narrower definition was employed.  For the purpose of this paper the term natural resources are 
strictly limited to hydrocarbons (i.e. oil and natural gas).  The justification is simple.  The fight 
over Cypriot resources is not one over pomegranates, or agriculture, etc., it is over hydrocarbons.  
The Republic of Cyprus is claiming legitimacy to extract their offshore natural gas deposits.  The 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is also fighting to have a share of the offshore natural gas 
fields off the island (BBC, 2011).  The focus of this crisis provides justification for the use of 
hydrocarbons in explaining the formation of alliances.     
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 Traditionally natural resources has been utilized to explain the formation and escalation 
of both inter and intrastate conflict.  The theory usually holds that if a state or actor is resource 
poor and if their neighbor is resource rich, the resource poor actor will attack the resource rich 
actor in order to obtain the material wealth.  These resources can then be used to power an 
economy or help equip a military for future conquest (i.e. Japan conquering oil rich countries in 
Asia).  From these studies it appears that natural resources have an impact on escalation of 
hostilities and the outbreak of hostilities between two groups (Ross, 2004; Russett, 1981; Klare, 
2001).  What is usually overlooked is how natural resources can be employed in the formation of 
alliances. 
 Fortunately there have been studies (albeit few) that have explored the relationship 
between natural resources and alliances.  It is true that there are states and actors that possess rich 
hydrocarbon reserves.  There are also states and actors that are resource poor (Russett, 1981; 
Klare, 2001).  Contrary to the common thought that competition for resources leads to conflict, 
natural resources can in fact lead to cooperation and alliance formation.  The literature suggests 
that states use hydrocarbons to attract allies.  A hydrocarbon poor state is likely to join an 
alliance if the other nation is resource rich and will allow it to partake in its hydrocarbons.  Even 
if a country is resource rich, the prospect of gaining more wealth is an alluring factor likely to 
draw an actor into an alliance (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa 
and Mansfield, 1993).  While most of these studies have focused on all natural resources or trade 
in general, this study diverts from that assumption.  For this analysis, the idea of a state using its 
abundant resources (i.e. hydrocarbons) to entice another state to join an alliance will be 
examined.    
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Hydrocarbons, both as a trigger and a factor in explaining alliance formation, will play a 
key role in the analysis.  Hydrocarbons set off this new round of hostilities between the two parts 
of Cyprus as well as attracting neighboring states to the crisis (BBC, 2011).  This concept ties 
into the regional security complex theory.  The discovery of these hydrocarbons had the greatest 
impact on the states that borders these offshore hydrocarbon fields (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and 
Waever, 2003).  Hydrocarbons could be a lever both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus could use to attract allies to their cause.  Since the extraction of 
offshore Cypriot hydrocarbons is new, the analysis will contribute to the existing literature 
pertaining to natural resources and alliances.   
Security Concerns 
 The difficulty with the field of security lies within the definition.  What is security?  How 
can one know if it is present?  How do states react to this concept?  This list goes on.  Granted 
this is a difficult term to define, but a definition has been found for this study.  Security is the 
level of fear in a state in regard to the actions of another state.  If a state is fearful for its 
existence, then it is classified as being insecure.  If a state is not concerned about its safety, then 
it is classified as secure (Walt, 1985; Smith, 1995).  For the purposes of this analysis, security 
will follow this definition.   
 As noted in the section dealing with why alliances form, the traditional explanation for 
the formation of alliances is security.  As the previous literature has shown, ethnic, religious, and 
hydrocarbon factors are all rooted in the need of an actor to be secure (Davis and Moore, 1997; 
Burg and Shoup, 1999; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004).  In this section of the literature review, a 
review of the role of security on alliance formation will be analyzed.  The final factor of alliance 
formation discussed for the purpose of the analysis is security. 
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 Security alliances form when there is a difference in power between two states or actors 
(i.e. one state is stronger than another state).    This causes the weaker state or actor to fear that 
the more powerful neighbor will exploit them, or invade them and annex them.  The weaker state 
will then pursue like minded states to form a defensive alliance.  It is hoped this alliance will 
have enough members and resources to deter the other side from attacking (Walt, 1985; Smith, 
1995; Sorokin, 1994a; Axelrod et al; 1995; Sorokin, 1994b).  Throughout history there have been 
several cases of security alliances forming. 
 After the end of the Second World War, the world was divided into two camps:  the West 
and the East.  Each camp assumed the other side was about to invade them to destroy their 
ideology.  As such, defensive alliances were created.  The West had NATO and the East had the 
Warsaw Pact (Levy, 1981).  The concept of security is responsible for many alliances in the 
Middle East.  Fearing Soviet encroachment on their territories, the countries of Turkey and Iran 
formed an alliance with the West to secure their territory.  The Arab states formed an alliance 
against Israel to better their chances of deterring Israel from attacking them (Walt, 1988).  This 
type of alliance has also driven Israel in its search for alliances.  Israel perceives itself to be 
surrounded by much stronger hostile neighbors.  As such, they are constantly looking for allies to 
defend their country from attack (Sorokin, 1994b).  The case of Israel is especially important to 
this analysis as Israel is one of the cases that is incorporated into this analysis.  The drive for 
security will also be important in understanding the needs of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to 
find allies to protect them from invasion. 
 In the analysis section of this paper, each factor of alliance formation may prove to be 
critical in explaining the current alignment of nations in the Cyprus drilling crisis.  In the next 
section, the literature will be built upon by further developing a theory that explains alliance 
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formation during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.  This literature will also allow hypotheses to 
be derived to test the theory.  All this will lead up to the analysis explaining the alignment of 
states during the Cyprus drilling crisis.     
III. Culture and Non-Culture Theory 
 In the previous section, the extensive literature dealing with the formation of alliances 
was surveyed.  While this literature covers much ground, all of these factors have not been 
considered together to explain a case of alliance formation.  In this section, these factors will be 
combined into a mixed theory.  The mixed theory will consist of a cultural angle and a non-
culturist angle.  From the literature presented above, and from a cursory reading of the events 
surrounding the Cypriot drilling crisis, four hypotheses will be formulated to test this combined 
theory to see if it can explain the formation of alliances during the offshore Cypriot drilling 
crisis. 
Culture 
 In international relations, a variable that has often been overlooked is the cultural variable 
(Lebow, 2008; Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009).  By omitting this variable, valuable data and 
conclusions have been overlooked.  This analysis will contribute to filling the gap left by the 
existing literature dealing with culture.  The first half of this theory consists of a cultural theory 
to understand international political behavior.  Lebow argues that a cultural theory of 
international relations will allow one to understand the causes of international state behavior 
(Lebow, 2008).  Unlike Lebow, the cultural theory of this analysis does not deal with the concept 
of honor per se.  While honor is an important cultural construct as to why actors might behave 
irrationally, it does not have an impact on this study.  This theory of culture is more like the 
theory of culture advocated by Ross.  Ross defines culture as being made up two separate and 
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distinct parts.  Those parts are religion and ethnicity (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009; Ross, 
2007; Huntington, 1997).  While ethnicity and religion are employed as two factors in the culture 
theory, it differentiates from Ross in that this analysis is not looking at these two factors in 
explaining conflict between groups.  The cultural half of the theory of this analysis focuses on 
ethnicity and religion.  From these two components, two hypotheses are derived to test their 
influence on the formation of alliances. 
 The first factor considered in this analysis is the factor of ethnicity.  Based on the 
literature regarding ethnicity and the formation of alliances, the first hypothesis is formulated. 
 H1:  States with similar ethnic makeup will form alliances with one another. 
This relationship holds that if one state has a similar ethnic makeup of another state in the 
international environment, those two states will form an alliance to guard their ethnic brethren 
from attack by a third ethnic group or state (Davis and Moore, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998).  
This hypothesis could explain the sides taken by Greece and Turkey during the Cypriot drilling 
crisis.  According to this hypothesis, Greece joined the Republic of Cyprus due to the fact the 
both of these states are made up of ethnic Greeks (Kitromilides, 1990).  Likewise the Republic of 
Turkey supported the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus due to the fact that 
both states are overwhelmingly constituted by the Turkish ethnicity (Landau, 1981).  While 
similar ethnicity can be a factor in explaining the formation of alliances, it is only the first 
component of the culture theory used in this analysis. 
 The second component of the culture theory used in this analysis is religion.  Based on 
the survey of the literature, a second hypothesis was derived to test the role of religion on the 
formation of alliances. 
 H2:  States will similar religious beliefs will form alliances with one another. 
  
16 
This relationship holds that if one state has similar religious beliefs with another state, the 
likelihood of both forming an alliance with each other increases.  In addition to alliances forming 
between states that practice the same religion, the religious factor also includes protecting their 
religious brethren from attack from a state that adheres to a different religion (Bugbee, 1877; 
Spagnolo, 1977).  This hypothesis reinforces the ethnic hypothesis previously mentioned.  
Greece and Turkey took their respective sides in the conflict due to sharing religious similarities 
with each state that constitutes the island of Cyprus.  The reason for this alignment could be 
protecting their religious brethren from domination from a different religious group.  This 
hypothesis can also explain the alignment of Russia in this crisis.  Russia is Orthodox Christian 
as is the Republic of Cyprus.  Therefore, according to this hypothesis, Russia would side with the 
state that shares their religion.  While both of these hypotheses contribute to the formation of 
alliances, one must look outside the realm of culture to the realm of the material. 
Non-Culture 
 In this approach, two main factors are included that have been identified in the formation 
of alliances that form outside of the culture realm.  While culture is an important theory to 
explain alliance formation, the literature clearly demonstrates there are factors outside of culture 
that influence the formation of alliances.  Those two main factors are hydrocarbon trade and 
security (Zweig, 1995; Walt, 1985).  Since these are outside the culture realm, these two factors 
are termed as non-cultural.  From the non-culture half of the theory two additional hypotheses 
are formulated that in addition to culture provide a complete picture on the formation of 
alliances. 
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 The first factor of the non-culture theory that will be tested is the role of hydrocarbon 
trade.  Based on the existing literature, a third hypothesis has been developed regarding the 
formation of alliances. 
 H3:  States will use their hydrocarbons to entice other states to join their alliance. 
Since some states in the international system are hydrocarbon poor, it stands to reason that states 
that have an abundance of hydrocarbons can use those resources to entice other states into their 
alliance (Russett, 1981; Clark et al, 2008).  This could be the case in explaining the alignment of 
Greece and Turkey.  In order to draw allies to back their claims to the oil and natural gas deposits 
off the coast of Cyprus, both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus would promise concessions to their allies.  This would also play into the culture theory.  
One side would not choose to help the “other” in terms of ethnicity and religion at the expense of 
their cultural brethren.  This could also explain the alignment of Israel in the conflict.  Israel has 
recently discovered a substantial natural gas field off its Mediterranean coast.  Their claim has 
subsequently been challenged by Lebanon and supported by Iran and Turkey.  Therefore, Israel 
would align with Cyprus to protect their drilling rights in the area (Jerusalem Post, 2011).  While 
this hypothesis inches us closer to the full picture, one still has to look at security concerns. 
  The second factor of the non-culture half of the theory is the security factor.  Based on 
the existing literature covering alliances, a fourth hypothesis has been developed to test the 
impact of this factor in the formation of alliances. 
 H4:  States will form alliances with another state in order to ensure their security. 
Security concerns are the primary factor driving the formation of alliances and it would be 
remiss to not include this factor in the analysis.  According to this hypothesis, states form 
alliances with other states in order to protect themselves from attack by a third state (Walt, 1985; 
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Smith, 1995; Burg and Shoup, 1999).  When examining this factor in conjunction with the other 
three, one gets a complete picture regarding the formation of alliances.  This factor is especially 
important in regards to the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
since each side fears the other.  The Turkish Cypriots fear Greek invasion and domination.  The 
Greek Cypriots fear Turkish invasion and annexation of their island to Turkey.  As such, both 
sides could seek alliances with other states to ensure their security (Hoffmeister, 2002; Souter, 
1984; Wolfe, 1988).  This same factor also holds true for Israel.  Since their fallout with Turkey 
over the Gaza flotilla incident, Israel is missing a major Mediterranean ally needed for its 
security.  As such, they are looking for other Mediterranean states to ally with to secure their 
Mediterranean holdings (Jerusalem Post, 2011; Debkafile, 2011).   
The two factors of the non-culture half of the theory compliments the two factors of the 
cultural half of the mixed theory.  Utilizing the combined theory of culture and non-culture new 
light will be shed on factors that influence the formation of alliances.    From this mixed theory, 
four hypotheses were formulated.  Each hypothesis will test a major component of culture and 
non-culture.  The next step in this analysis is to demonstrate how this mixed theory and the four 
hypotheses will be tested.     
IV. Methods 
 Theory and the hypotheses will be tested using a qualitative case study approach.  The 
cases that will be analyzed will be presented along with the justification as to why these cases 
were selected.  The next stage in this section will be discussing the method of analysis used to 
test the four hypotheses: content and historical analysis.  The data for each factor will be 
identified.  Finally, the justification for determining the results will be discussed. 
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Small – N Analysis 
 In previous studies of alliance formation, the analysis employed has been large-n 
quantitative analysis (Ross, 2004; Ross, 2007; Long, 2003; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993, Gowa 
and Mansfield, 2004).  While this has provided useful insight into alliances, it neglects 
identifying the specifics of case or region.  A small-n, qualitative case study analysis allows 
researchers to examine a case with more detail to see if the theory can be proved or disproved 
(Lijphart, 1971).  The other benefit for employing a qualitative case study approach is the 
usefulness it provides to policy makers.  The international system is complex with no two cases 
exactly matching.  In order to help policymakers make informed decisions on how to mitigate 
conflict between two countries, it is imperative for them to know the specifics of those countries.  
This can only be achieved through the case study approach (Johnson, 1997; Lustick, 1997; 
Sartori, 1970; King, et al, 2005).  This analysis will examine the cases of Cyprus, Great Britain, 
Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Israel to ascertain if the theory has any merit.   
Case Selection 
 The impact of the Cypriot conflict has numerous ramifications throughout the 
international sphere.  These include the impact of this offshore crisis on the E.U. (which the 
Republic of Cyprus and Greece are members and Turkey is trying to get in), the impact on 
NATO (NATO members Greece and Turkey have taken different sides during this crisis), and 
the impact on the U.N. and the U.S. (the effect of the crisis on the likelihood for settlement).  The 
list goes on, and if each state that took a position during this crisis was analyzed, this would 
quickly become a multivolume work.  In order to scale down the scope, case selection was 
employed.  The five cases of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Israel were chosen due 
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to three factors.  The first is the traditional approach.  The second is employing Regional 
Security Complex Theory.  The final factor employed in case selection is salience. 
The traditional approach helped select the cases based on their presence in previous 
studies dealing with the Cypriot conflict.  Great Britain was selected due to its traditional role as 
an actor in the Cypriot conflict.  They are the former imperial power of the island, a signatory to 
the Treaty of Guarantee which allows them to intervene in the affairs of the island, and have two 
military bases located on the island (Fox, 1993; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007).  
Greece and Turkey were selected during this phase due to their historical and cultural ties to the 
island.  In addition, they are both signatories to the Treaty of Guarantee which allows them to 
intervene in the affairs of the island.  Finally, reviewing the cases on the Cyprus conflict, these 
two countries are always present (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Hakki, 2007; Fox, 1993).   
The Regional Security Complex Theory holds that alliances are more likely to occur 
when states are in geographical proximity (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Buzan, 1991).  This allows 
for the inclusion of the cases of all five cases.  Great Britain was chosen due to their military 
presence on the island (Hakki, 2007).  Greece, Turkey, and Israel were selected due to their 
geographic proximity to the island (Borowiec, 2000; Fox, 1993; Jerusalem Post, 2011).  Finally, 
Russia was selected because of their naval presence in the Mediterranean.  They have bases in 
Syria and any tensions on the island of Cyprus could affect their fleet (Fenwick, 2011; Hurriyet, 
2011). 
The final factor for case selection is salience.  Great Britain has a strong stake on the 
island because of the presence of their two military bases.  They do not want to be caught in the 
crossfire if a conflict breaks out, so they have a strong motive for keeping the peace on the island 
(Smith, 2008; Oliver and Smith, 2010).  Greece and Turkey have a stake due to their obligations 
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to protect the political rights of their ethnic kin (Treaty of Guarantee, 1963).  Israel has a stake 
due because of the importance of having Cyprus protect their claims to the Leviathan natural gas 
field (UPI, 2011; Keinon, 2010; Jerusalem Post, 2011).  Finally, Russia has a stake due to their 
commercial and military interests in the region (Hurriyet, 2010; Fenwick, 2011).  With all of the 
factors taken into consideration, the selection of these five cases (Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, 
Russia, and Israel) is justified.   
Methodology 
For the purposes of this study, a mixed methodology including both qualitative content 
analysis along with historical analysis will be employed.  Each will complement the other by 
providing evidence for the different factors.  The factors of content analysis incorporated into 
this analysis are:  selecting the data to be analyzed, discussing the nature of the content, 
contextualizing the information, discussing the reliability of the results, and ascertaining validity 
(Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004).  This will be supplemented by the 
historical analysis to provide scholars and policymakers a complete picture of the formation of 
alliances in the recent Cyprus drilling crisis (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; George and Bennett, 
2005).  
What is content analysis and why is it employed in this analysis?  Content analysis is a 
tool available to both quantitative and qualitative researchers.  Both look at the content of 
speeches, interviews, etc. in order to explain political actions.  One of the most frequent forms of 
quantitative content analysis counts certain words (i.e. action verbs) in order to determine the 
importance a speech or interview has on an audience (Klotz and Prakash, 2009).  Qualitative 
content analysis looks at the speech, interview and/or policy statements and looks for the 
meaning of the content.  For example, a leader stated a preference and the qualitative scholar 
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wants to know how that translates into policy (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 1969; Mayring, 
2000; Kracaver, 1962; Kohlbacher, 2006).  Since this analysis looks at how speeches, interviews, 
and policy statements translate into the formation of alliances, the qualitative aspect will be used.  
 The first step in content analysis is selecting the data that will be employed. This is a 
crucial step, since the content sources selected here affect the other steps in setting up the 
qualitative content analysis (Holsti, 1969; Kracaver, 1962).  The content for each of the four 
hypotheses (ethnicity, religion, hydrocarbon trade, and security) will be taken from the major 
regional and global news networks.  These include the New York Times, Jerusalem Post, Today’s 
Zaman, Defence Greece, Debkafile (analysis of the news of the Middle East as analyzed by 
Israeli geopolitical specialists), Famagusta Gazette, etc.  These were selected due to a 
LexisNexis and major internet search engine search of news media.  This allowed for the 
filtering of hyped media (i.e. blogs) and it allowed the researcher to determine the news sources 
that carried the most impact.  It must be noted that these media outlets are in English and that 
could be a problem on measuring the impact of these stories.  However, in this paper, it is 
assumed that the stories in the English versions are the same as the stories reported in the native 
tongue of the news outlet.  The other problem with measuring the impact of these articles could 
lie with the fact that more Americans/foreigners are reading them than the native audience.  This 
is addressed by the assumption that this crisis does not affect the foreigners who do not have a 
vested interest.  Therefore, the high readership will come from the countries that are listed as 
case studies in this analysis.     For the complete listing of the news sources used for the content 
analysis, please see table 1.  
 The second step of content analysis methodology is discussing the nature of the content 
analyzed.  There are many sources of content available to content analysis scholars.  There is the 
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possibility of looking at speeches (public, private, or both) interviews (effect depends on the 
audience), and finally foreign policy statements (statements put forth by leaders in order to 
justify their position on a particular policy issue).  Each has its strengths and weaknesses (Klotz 
and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 1969).  For the purposes of this study all three will be employed.  
Speeches, interviews, and policy statements will all be utilized to see if leaders used one of the 
four hypotheses to explain why their country aligned with the state it did.  Leaving out one of the 
three, could lead to the omission of crucial data that could have an effect on the hypotheses.    
 The third step in the process of building a content analysis methodology is 
contextualizing the information.  This is a crucial step because it deals with the complexities of 
using speeches, interviews, and policy statements.  It addresses the questions:  is a leader being 
truthful or are there other factors that a leader takes into consideration that he does not share with 
the public (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Krippendorff, 2004; Kracaver, 1952; Kohlbacher, 2006)?  
Since this analysis employs speeches, interviews, and policy statements these questions need to 
be allayed.  The background factors (i.e. elections, trying to make their policies appease someone 
higher up (Medvedev with Putin)) will not play a crucial role in this analysis.  If a leader makes a 
speech, gives an interview, or releases a policy statement and subsequent policy is implemented 
as outlined in the speech, then that is all that is needed to show the tie between content and 
justifying one’s policies based on the four hypotheses.  Who is the source of this information is 
important to determining the context of the information.  For the purposes of this study, if a 
leader was quoted in a major regional or global news media outlet, then it is assumed that they 
are an authoritative figure on explaining governmental policy. 
The second concern is based on if a leader is being truthful.  It is also tied with the fourth 
step in establishing a content analysis methodology:  reliability (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 
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1969; Mayring, 2000).  This is resolved by the concept of commitment.  The sources used are 
major regional and global news media.  This means anything a leader says goes straight to the 
populace, the opposition, and to other leaders.  It acts as a signal to let the audience (both 
intended and unintended) know their justifications for political policy.  This accomplishes two 
criteria.  The first is that the audience believes their justification, and uses it to explain why the 
leader acted in a particular way.  The second is due to the costs associated with lying.  If a leader 
backs down from their position, or uses a different position then they are in danger of having the 
domestic and foreign opposition use this to remove them from power (Fearon, 1994; 
Mearsheimer, 2011).  Since leaders are committed to following through on their statements to the 
public, and if subsequent policy is implemented based on these statements, this resolves the 
concern of reliability associated with using content analysis.        
 The final step in establishing a methodology for content analysis is ascertaining the 
validity of the content.  Validity is how well one’s analysis helps one learn about the subject 
matter.  This is important, because if the results are not valid, then analysis is meaningless (Klotz 
and Prakash, 2009; Krippendorff, 2004; Holsti, 1969).  Leaders could simply be making 
statements to appease certain domestic and international actors, but they have no intention of 
following through on their statements.  For example, the U.S. talks about the need to end 
political repression in China to satisfy the demands of human rights groups; however, they are 
hesitant to employ policy to make China change its policy due to the economic dependence 
between the two.  For the purpose of this study; speeches, interviews, and policy statements are 
used.  However, they have to be tied to justifying implementation of certain policies (i.e. forming 
an alliance).  If there is no tie, then that content was not included in this analysis.  This 
demonstrates the validity of the content analysis performed in this section.    
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 While content analysis plays a large role in understanding why states aligned the way 
they did, there are supplemental methods that assist in providing a complete picture.  The main 
supplement is historical analysis.  This means looking to past events to understand how they 
affect the policies of the present (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; George and Bennett, 2005; Levy, 
1988).  Historical data will add credibility to the statements and actions of leaders.  It will also 
help fill in the gaps left by the content analysis.  Historical analysis is present for each of the 
ethnicity, religion, and security hypotheses.  In addition to history, there are other types of 
supplemental data used in this study.  For ethnicity, census and scholarly research will 
supplement the historical and content data.  Census data, journal articles, and books written 
about the effects of religion on each case will supplement the content and historical data.  
Geological reports and academic journals will supplement the content analysis performed for the 
hydrocarbon hypothesis.  Finally, journal articles will supplement the historical and content data 
for the security hypothesis.  For a complete listing of the data sources, please see table 1.  By 
combining these supplemental data sources to the content analysis, one is able to get the full 
picture of why states form alliances.     
 The final step in the methodology section is demonstrating how each hypothesis will be 
tested.  Census data will be used to determine if states share the same ethnicity.  If they do not, 
the presence of ethnic lobbies will be examined.  Ethnic lobbies are another way for an ethnic 
minority group to pressure the host government to enact certain policies (Mearsheimer and Walt, 
2007; Ambrosio, 2002).  If an ethnic lobby is not present then this hypothesis will be 
problematic.  If there is ethnic similarity, or if an ethnic lobby is present, then the content 
analysis of the speeches/interviews/policy statements will be examined to determine if ethnicity 
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was a cause for alliance formation.  This result will be strengthened by past state behavior on 
forming alliances. 
 The religious hypothesis will proceed in three stages.  The first is using the census data to 
determine if the religious makeup of each state is the same.  The next step will be testing the 
number of adherents over a ten year period.  This is an arbitrary number chosen due to its 
proximity to the present.  If one goes too far back, then the data is in danger of no longer being 
relevant to this case.  If the number of adherents is high and constant over those ten years, then 
the final test will commence.  The speeches/interviews/policy statements will be examined to see 
if religion was cited as a cause for the formation of alliances.  This conclusion will be backed by 
the historical analysis looking at why states aligned with others in the past.  
 The hydrocarbon hypothesis will first be tested by examining the geological reports of 
the states.  This will determine if a state is rich or poor in hydrocarbons.  This will help back the 
assumption that a rich hydrocarbon state will use its abundance to entice a hydrocarbon poor 
state to join an alliance.  Using this information, the speeches/interviews/policy statements of the 
leaders will be examined.  This comparison will allow one to determine if a state uses its 
resources, or wants hydrocarbons, in return for their alliance with the hydrocarbon rich state. 
 The final hypothesis tested in this analysis is the security hypothesis.  The test will 
proceed in various stages.  The first is establishing that the leaders of each state view the actions 
of another state as an existential threat to the security (Waever, 1993).  The next step is 
establishing that they both share a common enemy.  The third step is determining if the leaders 
ask for assistance from another state.  The fifth step is demonstrating that a state will come to the 
aid of another state in order to ensure their security.  The security dilemma will be demonstrated 
by historical works, journal articles, and the speeches/interviews/policy statements given by the 
  
27 
leaders of each state.  If all of these steps are present in the data (presented in table 1), then the 
security hypothesis is viable.          
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Chapter 2 
 
Cyprus:  The Pivot 
 
 In order to understand the factors that have lead up to the alignment of nations during the 
2011 offshore drilling crisis, one must look at the events and factors on the island of Cyprus.  
This chapter will serve as a case study of Cyprus.  The history of Cyrus will be examined and 
used to understand the grievances by both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots.  Also examined 
will be the demographic makeup of the island.  What percentage of the population is Greek, 
Turkish, or other?  Where these ethnic groups reside on the island will also be considered.  The 
grievances of both the Greek Cypriots as well as the Turkish Cypriots will be presented.  Finally, 
all this will be tied together to the current offshore drilling crisis that has beset the island. 
I. History 
 In order to understand the grievances of both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, 
it is imperative to understand their histories, or their psychonarratives (Ross, 2007).  In this 
section, the history of Cyprus from its early settlements to the aftermath of Cyprus joining the 
European Union will be explored.  As European Union ascension is the last significant historical 
event that aggravated the divisions of the island before the offshore drilling crisis, the history 
section concludes with that event. 
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The history of the island began with the Hittites, who established a protectorate over the 
island (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000).  During the later period of this protectorate, when the Hittite 
power was declining, Greek migration to the island began.  The first Greek settlers came to 
Cyprus from Asia Minor on rafts during the Stone Age (approximately 7,000 B.C). These settlers 
built unique beehive shaped houses and cities. The 11th and 12th centuries B.C. saw the arrival 
of the Achaean Greeks to Cyprus.  They brought with them the Greek language, religion, and 
customs.  These Greek colonists were responsible for building the cities of Amathus, Curium, 
and Kition.  The Greeks attempted to establish first independent city-states and later kingdoms 
on the island.  However, due to the strategic location of the island on the Mediterranean trade 
routes, it was often attacked by the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Persians.  The Assyrians ruled the 
island from 709-669 B.C.  Once the Assyrian Empire collapsed, the island was ruled by the 
Egyptians until 546 B.C.  The Persians then dominated the island.  However, the Persians 
constantly had to deal with the rebellious Greeks who sided against the Persians in the first 
Greco-Persian war.  Persian rule was broken when the Persians were defeated by Alexander the 
Great (Fox, 1993).  The island would stay under Hellenic control until the invasion of Rome in 
58 B.C.  Rome controlled the island until 330 A.D. but while in Rome’s possession, the Greek 
culture flourished on the island.  The most important influence of the island came when the 
Byzantines succeeded the Romans.  The Byzantines considered themselves to be Hellenic and 
part of the Greek Orthodox Church, so both the Hellenic culture and the Orthodox Church 
formed the Cypriot identity during this time period (Borowiec, 2000).  This dynamic was later 
changed by the Latin crusades. 
 Richard the Lionheart landed on the island in 1191 A.D.  Justifying a war to bring the 
island under his control, he stated that he was not given a proper reception.  Richard conquered 
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the island.  However, due to the large debts that occurred during his crusade he had to sell the 
island to the Knights Templar.  The Templars then turned the island over to Guy de Lusignan, 
the last king of Latin Jerusalem.  The island remained under his household until the Venetians 
took over in 1489 as payment for protecting the island from Genoese assault.  The Latin 
Kingdom drastically altered the ethnic landscape of the island.  They persecuted the clergy of the 
Orthodox Church and stripped the Church from its dominant political position.  The Latin 
Kingdom also suppressed the Greek culture of the island and tried to replace it with a Latin 
culture (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000).   
The persecution by the Latin Kingdom against the Greek community ended with the 
invasion of the Ottoman Turks in 1570 A.D.  After a brutal campaign that saw the slaughter of 
over 20,000 people in Nicosia, the Ottomans finally conquered the island.  The Ottomans killed 
the Venetian governor due to the perception that he made women and children starve during the 
siege of Famagusta.  The Ottomans evicted the Latins and the Catholic Church from the island.  
They restored the Greek Orthodox Church, and under the millet system allowed the Greek 
Archbishop to rule over the Greeks that lived on the island.  However, the economy of the island 
stagnated during the period of Ottoman control.  When Greece won its independence from the 
Ottomans in 1821, a revolt broke out in Cyprus to join the island with the newly independent 
Greek state.  This was the beginning of the enosis, or union with Greece, movement.  The 
Ottomans suppressed the revolt and executed the Orthodox Church leaders that were responsible.  
The movement was marginalized until the aftermath of the First World War.  The main result of 
the Ottoman conquest was that it introduced the Turkish ethnicity to the island.  Due to its close 
proximity to Turkey, and being an Ottoman province, Turkish migration to the island flourished.   
It grew to such a level that they became the second largest ethnic group on the island.  However, 
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with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the island would soon be offered to another power in 
exchange for protection (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000).  The new masters of Cyprus were the 
British. 
 The Ottoman state was weakening due to domestic revolts, corruption, and foreign wars.  
The Ottoman sultan found he could no longer withstand the attacks from Russia without foreign 
assistance.  Therefore, he turned to the British for help.  In return for their aid against a Russian 
invasion, the Ottomans were willing to allow the British to administer the island of Cyprus while 
the sultan still retained official possession.  The signing of the Cyprus Convention in 1878 saw 
the transfer of Cyprus to British rule.  The British used the island as a base to protect their 
economic interests in the Mediterranean.  When World War I broke out in 1914, the Ottomans 
joined the Germans in the war against the British.  As a result, Great Britain annexed Cyprus as a 
crown colony.  They first offered Cyprus to King Constantine I of Greece to entice him to join 
the allies.  He refused preferring to keep Greece neutral.  In 1923, Turkey renounced its claims to 
the island in the peace of Lausanne.  Many Greek Cypriots hoped that Cyprus would be united 
with Greece.  However, when it became apparent that would not be the case, armed conflict 
broke out.  The Greeks fought the British to have the island joined with Greece.  The Turkish 
Cypriots fought the Greeks to keep that from happening.  Some Turkish groups even pushed to 
have the island partitioned with their part being re-united with Turkey.  As with Israel, this 
violence led Great Britain to work with the moderates of both sides to establish an independent 
state of Cyprus.  Cyprus gained independence in 1960 following the signing of a treaty between 
Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey all agreeing to recognize the new island state (Mallinson and 
Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007).  Independence did not end the conflict on the island. 
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 The Cypriot constitution of 1960 was a power sharing document between the Turk and 
the Greek Cypriots.  A quota system was implemented to fill the governing positions of the 
island.  The Turkish community would have a permanent veto over legislation. Turkish Cypriots 
were guaranteed 30% representation in parliament and the administration.  Great Britain retained 
bases for its armed forces on the island.  Both Greece and Turkey were tasked with making sure 
that their respective ethnic groups were not mistreated by the other group (Hakki, 2007; 
Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005).  However, the Greek Cypriots were not satisfied by these terms.  
Under the Presidency of Archbishop Makarios III, a new constitution was proposed that would 
do away with the power sharing agreement and allow the Greeks to completely control the 
government.  The Turks were forced into enclaves to mitigate their political power.  This led the 
Turks to fight back.  The conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was called the 
intercommunal conflicts.  Turkey threatened to intercede, but the U.S. blocked the Turkish 
proposal.  In 1974, the Cypriot National Guard staged a coup to bring the island into a union with 
Greece.  This led to the Turkish invasion.  The fighting ended with the partition of the island.  
The northern 1/3rd stayed under Turkish control, while the southern 2/3rds stayed under Greek 
Cypriot control (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000).  The island remains divided to this day. 
 The 1974 Greek Cypriot National Guard coup and Turkish invasion divided the island 
into two parts.  After civilian rule was restored in the southern 2/3rds, it was allowed to take on 
its duties as the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus that was established in 1960.  The 
northern 1/3
rd
 was under the control of Turkey.  In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots established the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the area that they controlled.  It is only recognized by 
Turkey (Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000).  The international community has tried to resolve the 
crisis and reunite the island.  The closest attempt was the 2004 Annan plan.  The Annan plan 
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called for a federal system in Cyprus.  It called for power sharing between the two ethnic 
communities.  It called for the removal of foreign troops from the island.  Finally, it called for 
the abolishment of the army on the island so that conflict would not occur between the two sides.  
If both sides adopted the proposal, then Cyprus would be admitted into the European Union.  
Turkey, under the AKP (Justice and Development Party), supported the plan and urged the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to agree to the plan.  The Greek Cypriots; however, 
rejected the plan.  The result was the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly approved the plan.  It 
failed due to the Greek Cypriots voting overwhelmingly to defeat the plan.  As a result, Greek 
Cyprus was admitted to the European Union and became responsible for passport allocation to 
the Turkish Cypriots.  The Turks cried foul.  They had agreed to the unification plan, yet they 
were being punished (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008).  The 
reasons for this plan’s failure will be further explored in the grievances section. 
II. The Demographics of Cyprus 
 Demographics play a central role in this analysis.  In this section, the distance of Cyprus 
to the different homelands of the ethnic groups will be examined.  This is important in 
understanding the relations Cyprus has with these two states.  Then how this correlates to the 
ethnic population percentages in each section of the partitioned island, and the location of the 
ethnic groups and how they came to be in those locations will be examined.  These factors, along 
with the histories of both Cypriot ethnic groups, will contribute to the grievances section.  The 
factors displayed in this section will also shed light on the current drilling crisis.  The ethnic 
ratios, the location of the offshore hydrocarbons, and the ethnic grievances combined have 
contributed to the further hostility between the two ethnic groups. 
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 The geography of Cyprus plays a crucial role in the ethnic makeup of the island.  Cyprus 
is located approximately 695 miles south east of Greece.  This relatively short distance facilitated 
the migration of the Achaean Greeks to the island.  This also influenced where the Greeks 
settled, mainly in the parts of the island closest to their homeland (Fox, 1993).  Cyprus is located 
approximately 283 miles south of Turkey.  This factor facilitated both Greek and Turkish 
migration to the island.  The short distance allowed Greeks from the city states in Asia Minor 
and later Byzantium to migrate to the island.  Once Byzantium and Cyprus came under the 
dominion of the Turks, this short distance facilitated the migration of the Turks to the island.  
The Turks settled in the north closest to their ethnic motherland (Borowiec, 2000).  This will 
come into play later in the analysis.   
 After the 1923 treaty was signed between Greece and Turkey ending the war between the 
two, there was a population exchange between the two countries.  The Greeks in Turkey were 
“relocated” to Greece and the Turks in Greece were relocated to Turkey.  However, this 
population exchange did not change the ethnic ratio of Cyprus since it was under the control of 
the British (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000).  However, the 
homogeneity of the population was disrupted by the intercommunal violence.  The fighting 
between the two groups led to ethnic enclaves throughout the island.  This began the process of 
segregating the island into a Greek part and a Turkish part.  The final division occurred with the 
Turkish invasion of 1974.  The Turks fled to the northern 1/3
rd
 of the island that was under the 
control of the Turkish military.  The Greeks fled to the southern part of the island that was not 
under the control of the Turkish military (Fox, 1993; Hakki, 2007).  This act resulted in the 
current division of the island that has lasted until the present day (see figure 1 for a map showing 
the partition of the island).   
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 The southern 2/3rds of the island are under Greek Cypriot control.  Their portion of the 
island is named the Republic of Cyprus.  It is generally viewed by the international body as the 
legitimate government of the island (Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007).  The location 
of this portion of the island is identified in figure 1.  According to the census data available 
through the Central Intelligence Agency, the Greeks on this portion of the island make up 77% 
of the island’s total population of 1,120,489 (July 2011 estimate).  There is also the “other”, 
which makes up 5% of the island’s population (this corresponds to Maronites, Jews, Armenians, 
and other ethnicities).  The dominant religion of the Republic of Cyrus is Greek Orthodox, which 
corresponds to the Greek ethnic group on this portion of the island.  The Maronite Catholics and 
the Armenian Apostolic Church make up 5% of the island’s total religious confession.  These 
two groups are mainly located in the Republic of Cyprus.  Islam is virtually nonexistent in the 
Republic of Cyprus (CIA World Factbook, 2011).         
 The northern 1/3
rd
 of the island is under the control of the Turkish Cypriots.  The Turkish 
Cypriots named their portion of the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  It is only 
recognized by the Republic of Turkey (Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007; Fox, 1993).  The location 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is identified in figure 1.  According to the census 
data made available through the Central Intelligence Agency, the total number of Turks living on 
the island makes up 18% of the island’s total population of 1,120,489 (July 2011 estimate).  The 
Turkish Cypriots live entirely in the section of the island that is under their control.  
Corresponding with the Turkish Cypriot population is the percentage of adherents to Sunni 
Islam.  18% of the population of Cyprus adheres to Sunni Islam, and this is because it is the faith 
of the Turkish Cypriots.  There are no other recognized faiths that operate in the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (CIA World Factbook, 2011).   
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 Geographic and demographic factors play a central role in Cyprus.  As shown in this 
section, distance to Greece and Turkey is important to the current ethnic makeup of the island.  
In the next chapter dealing with Greece and Turkey, distance and ethnic makeup will be a key 
component of the analysis.  The intercommunal violence and the Turkish invasion of 1974 that 
partitioned the island into two entities also play a central role in the analysis.  In the next section, 
the relocation of ethnic groups and how it affects their grievances towards one another will be 
examined.  The location of the two ethnic groups is also important in exploring their dispute over 
drilling rights for the offshore hydrocarbons of Cyprus.   
III. The Grievances 
 The historical and demographic factors play a crucial role in the grievances of each ethnic 
group on the island of Cyprus.  Due to their differing versions of the history of the island (i.e. 
psychonarratives) and the results of the intercommunal conflicts and the Turkish invasion of 
1974, both sides are left with a list of grievances against the other ethnic group (Ross, 2007; 
Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000).  In this section, the grievances that both ethnic groups have with 
one another will be listed.  This will set the framework for how these grievances played out 
during the offshore drilling crisis. 
 There are four main grievances of the Greek Cypriot community against the Turkish 
Cypriot community and Turkey.  The first grievance is that the Turks stand in the way of enosis, 
or union of the island with Greece.  They feel the island is theirs since they were the first to settle 
there and have the longest continual presence on the island.  Therefore, it should be up them to 
decide if their island is reunited with their motherland.  The Turks have fought to keep this from 
occurring.  As long as there are Turks on the island, to the Greeks, enosis is impossible.  The 
second grievance is the overrepresentation the Turks demand.  The Greek Cypriots see the 
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Turkish Cypriots as a minority that has been given too much political power by ethnic quotas for 
the government.  They believe this diminishes their political voice.  This is one of the reasons 
why the Greeks wanted to amend the 1960 constitution.  They wanted to make it fairer in their 
eyes (Borowiec, 2000, Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005).  The third grievance is the 
right of return.  After the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent partition of the island, many 
Greeks fled their homes in the North rather than live under Turkish rule.  Their land was 
appropriated by the Turks of the North and settled by those Turks fleeing from the south and by 
the Turks migrating from Turkey (which in of itself is a grievance).  Finally, the fourth grievance 
is the presence of Turkish troops on their island.  In the eyes of the Greek Cypriots, the military 
presence of Turkey on the island is the main reason why peace and reunification has not been 
achieved.  They feel once the Turkish military is gone, the force that divides the island will be 
removed.  This will allow for easier reunification (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and 
Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000).  The concerns of the Greek Cypriots are also 
mirrored by the Turkish community living on Cyprus. 
 There is one major grievance that the Turkish Cypriot community has against the Greek 
controlled Republic of Cyprus.  That grievance is discrimination.  Once Cyprus became an 
independent state in 1960, the Turkish community faced harassment by the Greeks trying to 
silence their opposition to enosis.  The Turks especially felt threatened when the Greeks 
proposed to take away their guaranteed voice in government by amending the constitution to 
eliminate ethnic quotas in the government.  The coup in 1974 led many Turks to believe that 
their home was about to become a part of Greece, wherein they would be persecuted further.  
Therefore, they turned to Turkey to prevent this from occurring (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000; 
Hakki, 2007).  Even after partition of the island, the Turkish community still faced 
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discrimination.  They were not recognized by the international community as their own 
independent state.  As such, they had to go to the Republic of Cyprus to obtain passports to 
conduct international travel.  The Turks claim that the Greek Cypriots are discriminatory when 
issuing passports to the Turks.  Another example of discrimination is the Annan plan and the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union.  Urged by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots voted 
overwhelmingly in support of the Annan plan to unite the island and gain membership into the 
European Union.  In spite of this support, the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan and killed it.  
The end result, the Greek Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the European Union and the 
Turkish part of the island was ostracized.  The Turkish community in North Cyprus views the 
Greek Cypriots demanding the concessions, through the European Union, that the Turkish 
community believes will further reduce their status in a united Cyprus (Hakki, 2007; Ker-
Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008).  The next section will analyze how 
these grievances are manifested during the offshore drilling crisis.  It also plays a factor in the 
alignment of nations during this crisis. 
IV. The Offshore Drilling Crisis 
 History, especially the partition, plays an important role in understanding the two sides of 
the offshore drilling crisis.  The demographics also play a key role by showing where the 
proposed drilling and exploration sites are located in relation to the two parts of the island.  
Finally, the grievances play a key role in explaining the actions of both sides during the offshore 
drilling crisis.  The causes for the drilling can be explained in the framework of the grievances 
listed in the previous section.   In this section, it will be analyzed how these factors have come 
together.  This will help one understand the actions taken by both sides during this offshore 
drilling crisis. 
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 Before the grievances of the crisis are addressed, it is important to look at the facts as 
they stand so far.  In 2007, the Republic of Cyprus opened bids to explore their offshore 
hydrocarbons.  The winning bid went to Noble Energy headquartered in Houston, Texas.  Noble 
Energy began drilling in Block 12 on September 18, 2011 (BBC, 2011).  The area where Noble is 
drilling is identified in figure 2.  As one can tell, Block 12 falls located south of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  In response to this exploration, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus granted 
Turkey the right to explore for hydrocarbons off their coast (Al Jazeera, 2011).  In November 
2011, Turkey granted Royal Dutch Shell the permission to begin offshore drilling off of Cyprus 
(Dombey and Kavanagh, 2011).  The area that will be explored by Royal Dutch Shell lies 
between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey.  This is indicated by figure 2.  
Logically, one would not see a problem here.  Both sides are drilling in the areas that are 
adjacent to their parts of the island.  However, grievances by both sides have led to the current 
crisis between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
 The grievances held by both the Greeks and the Turks are responsible for the crisis 
between the two over the offshore drilling.  In this paragraph, the analysis deals with the 
grievances by the Greek Cypriots.  The Greek Cypriots believe that the Turks are withholding 
energy independence for the island.  They have the resources to bring in these offshore 
hydrocarbons and they should be allowed to exploit those resources (BBC, 2011; Jerusalem Post, 
2011; Defence Greece, 2011a).  The Greek Cypriots also accuse the Turks of demanding more 
than their fair share of the offshore hydrocarbons (Kanli, 2011; BBC, 2011).  This harkens back 
to the historical grievance that the Turks are receiving more per capita than are the Greeks.  They 
see this as unfair.  The Greek Cypriots are also angered that the Turkish Republic of Northern 
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Cyprus has allowed Turkey to exploit the offshore hydrocarbons that belong to the island.  They 
strongly object to an outsider getting their resources (BBC, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011a).   
 The Turkish Cypriots also have a grievance against the Greek Cypriots drilling for 
offshore resources.  They see this as a continuation of discrimination against them by the Greek 
Cypriots.  According to the view of the Cypriot Turks, the decision by the Greek Cypriots to drill 
means that they are denied the revenues that will come from this exploration.  They insist that the 
20% that the Greek Cypriots offered is not enough.  They demand an equal share to ensure that 
they are not taken advantage of as they have been in the past (Kanli, 2011).  The reason why they 
allowed Turkey to explore their offshore hydrocarbons was due to the fact that they needed 
someone with the capital to attract drilling firms.  Also, this arrangement would ensure that they 
would receive a fair share of the profits (Al Jazeera, 2011; Today’s Zaman, 2011a).  One can see 
how the historical psychonarrative plays an important role in shaping the policies of the Turks in 
Northern Cyprus. 
V. Conclusion 
 The chapter dealing with Cyprus is critical in understanding the relations between the two 
ethnic groups on the island.  Understanding how the two groups interact also plays a role in the 
alignment of foreign nations during the 2011 offshore drilling crisis.  The history of the island 
ties it to Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey.  The conflict between the two also spills over to 
invite outside intervention.  In the next two chapters, the analysis will explore how the relations 
between the two ethnic groups on the island affect the alignment of nations, especially during the 
2011 offshore drilling crisis.  Chapter 3 will deal with the traditional actors:  Great Britain, 
Greece, and Turkey.  History plays an important role in the involvement of Great Britain.  
History and ethnic grievances involve both Turkey and Greece.  Chapter 4 deals with the new 
  
41 
actors:  Israel and Russia.  Their involvement will play off the religion and security issues of the 
Greek Cypriot side of the conflict.  Throughout the analysis, one will be able to see how the 
factors discussed here play a crucial role in the foreign relations of the island.     
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Traditional Actors:  Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey 
 
 This section of the analysis seeks to understand the alignment of the traditional actors 
during the 2011 Cyprus offshore drilling crisis.  Each one of these states has a strong connection 
to the island.  Greece has dominated the island from early settlements up to the Byzantine period.  
The Turks held control over the island from the 1500s to 1878.  Finally, Great Britain possessed 
the island from 1878 until 1960 (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000).  When one thinks of the disputes 
on the island, these three states are at the forefront.  The situation is no different in regards to the 
current offshore drilling crisis.  The involvement of these three states is relative to their historical 
ties to the island, as well as their position as guarantors in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee 
(Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007).  This chapter of the analysis will test the four 
hypotheses in order to gain a more complete understanding of why the states chose the sides they 
did during the 2011 Cyprus offshore drilling crisis. 
I. Great Britain 
The first case of the empirical analysis of this project is Great Britain.  Great Britain is 
the most recent actor compared to the historical legacies of both the Greeks and the Turks on the 
island.  However, Great Britain is important to this analysis for a variety of 
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reasons.  The first point being that Great Britain had possession of the island from 1878 till 1960 
so there is a historical connection (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007).  Second, Great 
Britain is a signatory to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.  By the provisions of this treaty, Great 
Britain reserves the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the island in order to make sure 
ethnic harmony is achieved (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960).  Finally, in the recent offshore drilling 
crisis, Great Britain announced its support of the right for the Greek controlled Republic of 
Cyprus to explore its offshore resources (Cypriot Chronicle, 2011a; Papapostolou, 2011; Barber, 
2011).  Now the question becomes, why did Great Britain side with the Greek Cypriots on this 
particular matter?  By testing the four hypotheses of this analysis, the answer can be found. 
Ethnicity 
 According to the first hypothesis, belonging to similar ethnic groups could explain why 
Great Britain supported the rights of the Republic of Cyprus to explore its offshore 
hydrocarbons.  In order to test this hypothesis, one needs to explore the ethnic composition of 
both states.  According to the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 83.6% of 
the Great Britain’s population belongs to the British ethnic group, 8.6% belongs to the Scottish 
ethnic group, 4.9% belongs to the Welsh ethnic group, with 2.9% belonging to the Northern Irish 
ethnic group.  Only 1.6% of the population is classified as “other” (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  
The “other” category is where one finds the Cypriot population.  According to the census data 
from the British Broadcasting Company, the special interest section of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus located in the Turkish embassy, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, there are 300,000 Cypriots living in Great Britain.  130,000 are 
Turkish Cypriots and 170,000 are Greek Cypriots (BBC, 2005; TRNC Info, 2001; Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008).  This correlates to approximately .0047% of 
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the British population of 62,698,362 as being Cypriot, while 95% of the population of Cyprus 
identify as being Cypriot (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  The data suggests that there is no ethnic 
similarity between the two states to explain why Great Britain supported the offshore drilling of 
the Republic of Cyprus.  However, ethnicity can play an important role via the power of interest 
groups. 
 Interest groups play an important role in making sure that the government is aware of the 
needs of the minority (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Lohmann, 1998).  This has been capitalized by 
ethnic minorities to ensure that their current state of residence pursues favorable policies towards 
their homelands (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Ambrosio, 2002).  The impact of ethnic interest 
groups on British foreign policy will be explored.  The main Cypriot interest group is the Cypriot 
Federation.  The goal of this group is to represent the interests of Cypriots living in Great Britain, 
as well as to push for a unified Cyprus and the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island 
(cypriotfederation.org/uk).  This group has strong ties to the conservative party currently 
administrating British politics.  Soon after the offshore drilling crisis began, this interest group 
held an event that included the conservative Ministers of Parliament.  At the event, the 
conservative government pledged to support the rights of Cyprus to explore its offshore 
resources.  They also decried Turkish meddling in the matter as destabilizing reunification efforts 
between the two parts of Cyprus.  Minister of Parliament Tannock called Turkey’s actions 
“bullying and unnecessary pressure” and that “Turkey has no right to say that this drilling should 
stop” (Cypriot Chronicle, 2011b).  This translated into policy as the conservative government of 
Great Britain publicly supported the offshore exploration and drilling of the Republic of Cyprus, 
and condemned the actions of Turkey in the region in separate statements to the Greek Reporter 
and to the Famagusta Gazette.  This is what the British Foreign Minister had to say over the 
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matter “as the Minister has said we support fully and unequivocally the rights of Cyprus to its 
EEZ. That has been reaffirmed in the Commonwealth; it has been reaffirmed in the EU on many 
occasions in the past. So, we support that without any qualification and we want that to be well-
known and understood in all countries” (Papapostolou, 2011; Barber, 2011).  This is an example 
of how a statement to appease the Cypriot Federation was translated into policy a couple of days 
later.  In this light, the data supports the hypothesis that ethnicity has played a role in the decision 
of Great Britain to support the Republic of Cyprus in its offshore exploration and drilling. 
 Ethnicity has been cited as a consideration for the choices a state makes in an 
international dispute (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997).  This concept was tested in the 
case of Great Britain.  The first test was to see if the ethnicities were similar in both countries.  
The data shows that the ethnicities of the two states are indeed different.  Therefore, the ethnic 
hypothesis is problematic in this regard.  In spite of this, the test continued by looking at the 
impact of ethnic lobby groups.  The Cypriot Foundation is one of the most powerful lobbies in 
Great Britain due to its connection with the ruling conservative party.  The data supports that the 
efforts of this lobby is responsible for the government of Great Britain supporting the right of the 
Republic of Cyprus to conduct offshore exploration and drill for offshore hydrocarbons.  While 
hypothesis one is supported in this instance, the other three hypotheses also need to be tested. 
Religion 
 The second hypothesis of the analysis holds that religious similarity could be responsible 
for the alignment of nations during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis.  In order for this hypothesis 
to be validated, the religions of the two states must be similar as well as religion playing a role in 
foreign policy decisions.  This hypothesis is supported by the early historical relationship 
between Great Britain and Cyprus.  According to the Cyprus Convention, Great Britain received 
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Cyprus in order to protect the Christians living on the island.  “In return, His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary Reforms, to be agreed upon later between 
the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of 
the Porte in these territories”  (Cyprus Convention, 1878).  During this time period, both states 
were under strong religious leaders.  The archbishop of the Orthodox Church ruled the majority 
Greek Cypriots, and the British queen was the head of the Anglican Church.  This led to Britain 
taking the island under their control in order to make sure that the Christians living on the island 
were not mistreated (Fox, 1993; Hakki, 2007).  However, in the present, religion becomes more 
problematic. 
In order to determine the impact of religion, a ten year survey was conducted.  The results 
show the changes in religious adherence.  This allows one to determine the impact of a religious 
populace on its leaders.  According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, of 
the religious population in Great Britain in 2000, approximately 95% were Christian (CIA World 
Factbook, 2000).  Eleven years later in 2011, the Christian population of Great Britain decreased 
to approximately 71.6% of the population, according to the reports provided by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  This is evidence of the trend of secularization 
in Great Britain that started after the Second World War.  Religion appears to be playing less of a 
role in the politics of Great Britain as a result of this trend of secularization.  As Britain becomes 
more secular, religion plays a smaller role in politics especially in foreign affairs (Gilbert, 1980; 
Bruce and Glendinning, 2010; Shakman Hurd, 2006).  True to the findings of these scholars, a 
search of LexisNexis, internet search engines, and the major news media could not find quotes 
by British leaders to indicate that religion played any role in Great Britain’s support of the 
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Republic of Cyprus’ right to conduct offshore exploration and drilling.  As such, the data to 
support the second hypothesis is problematic. 
 The second hypothesis dealing with religion as the variable explaining Great Britain’s 
support of the Republic of Cyprus’ decision for offshore drilling was tested in this section of the 
analysis.  During the early years of the relationship between Great Britain and Cyprus, religion 
played a dominant role.  This is evidenced by the wording of the Cyprus Convention transferring 
administrative control of Cyprus from the Ottomans to the British.  However, the secularization 
trend in Great Britain makes the hypothesis a problem.  The increasing secularization of British 
politics means that religion plays a negligible role in justifying foreign policies.  This was 
evidenced by the lack of religious reference on the part of the leaders of Great Britain in 
supporting the offshore drilling of the Republic of Cyprus.  It is therefore safe to conclude that in 
the regard to the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis, religion played no role in the decision of Great 
Britain to support the Republic of Cyprus. 
Hydrocarbons 
 The third hypothesis holds that hydrocarbons could be responsible for the alignment of 
nations during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis.  In order for this hypothesis to work, a state must 
have abundant hydrocarbons and another state must be lacking those hydrocarbons.  It is also 
imperative that the state with the resources be willing to allow the other state access in order to 
secure their support.  The resource poor state must also be willing to negotiate for those 
resources instead of using coercion to gain said resources (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et 
al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).   
The first part of the test is to establish that one state is resource rich and the other state is 
resource poor.  In the case of Cyprus, geologists estimate that the potential reserves of 7 trillion 
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cubic feet are enough to make Cyprus energy independent as well as becoming an exporter of 
hydrocarbons (BBC, 2011; Jerusalem Post, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011a).  Great Britain’s 
significant hydrocarbon field is located in the North Sea.  According to geologists, the high 
demand in hydrocarbons has led to a reduction in their reserves.  The region has dropped from 
400 meters bbl per day to 180,000 bbl per day.  As a result, through British Petroleum 
(hereinafter referred as BP), Britain has had to satisfy its energy needs through international 
drilling (Tharoor, 2010; Forsyth and Kay, 1980; Ferrier, 1982; Hammond and Mackay, 1983).  
Since the condition for this hypothesis is present, it is time to test to see if the hypothesis 
explains the alignment of Great Britain during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis. 
 The main oil and gas company that satisfies the energy of Great Britain is BP (Tharoor, 
2010; Ferrier, 1982).  In order for the third hypothesis to be supported, there must be a transfer of 
potential energy from Cyprus to Great Britain via BP in exchange for the support of Great 
Britain.  BP does have operations in Cyprus; however, their operations mainly deal with 
distributions rather than in exploration and drilling (BP Cyprus, 2011).  A search of LexisNexis, 
the major internet search engines, and the major news media does not yield any results for BP 
drilling off Cyprus any time soon, or the Republic of Cyprus promising hydrocarbons to Great 
Britain in return for their support of their offshore exploration and drilling activity.  However, 
according to a report published in Globes, Cyprus is currently in the stages of proposing another 
round of concessions (Globes, 2011).  This means that in the future, BP can drill for the offshore 
resources of Cyprus and that Great Britain might benefit from such an excursion.  The results of 
the second concession plans could validate this hypothesis.  Great Britain’s support for the 
drilling activities of the Republic of Cyprus may translate into concessions to the benefit of Great 
Britain. 
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 The third hypothesis holds that hydrocarbon trade could be responsible for Great Britain 
aligning with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis.  Conditions are 
present to support this hypothesis.  The Republic of Cyprus would have enough potential energy 
to export to Great Britain to secure its support.  Great Britain needs these resources.  However, 
the data does not support this hypothesis at the time of the writing.  Perhaps the actions taken by 
Great Britain to support the Republic of Cyprus’ offshore drilling will be beneficial in the second 
concession round.  The Republic of Cyprus may reward Great Britain for its support by giving 
BP the right to drill off its coasts and export some of the extracted materials back to Great 
Britain.  This will be resolved through future research. 
Security 
 The fourth and final hypothesis holds that security concerns could explain why Great 
Britain sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis.  In order for 
this hypothesis to hold true, the Republic of Cyprus would ask Great Britain for support of their 
drilling activities due to fear of Turkish intervention.  Great Britain would become involved 
because the events could affect their security.  Security has certainly played an important role in 
the past between the two states.  The 1878 Cyprus Convention gave Cyprus to Great Britain in 
exchange for Great Britain’s protection of the Ottoman Empire from an attack by Russia.   “If 
Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be 
made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial 
Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join 
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms” (Cyprus Convention, 
1878).  The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee also allows Great Britain to retain two sovereign military 
bases (Aktrotiri and Dhekelia) in Cyprus to protect the interests of Great Britain in the Eastern 
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Mediterranean.  A map with the location of the two bases is represented in figure 3 (the bases are 
shaded red).  Plus, the treaty ensured that Great Britain would act as a guarantor to make sure 
that neither ethnic group would take advantage of the other Cypriot ethnic group.  “In the event 
of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom 
undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure 
observance of the provisions” (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960).  
During the Turkish invasion of 1974, the British military base at Dhekelia was used to 
transfer fleeing Greek Cypriot refugees from the North to the South.  The Turkish army did not 
attack the bases, nor did the British army engage the Turkish army.  This was done to prevent 
conflict between the two states and NATO allies (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007).  
However; after this instance, Great Britain has not taken an active part in the security of the 
island.  After the end of the colonial era, the bases are no longer viewed as necessary.  There was 
nothing for the bases to protect.  Also, the events of 1974 showed that the British would not 
militarily intervene to protect the government of the island.  According to The Times, these 
factors have led to the discussion in the British Parliament for the dismantling of the bases due to 
budgetary concerns (Oliver and Smith, 2010).  The current President of the Republic of Cyprus, 
Christofias, in a public speech reported in The Guardian, has called for the removal of the British 
troops due their failure to protect the territorial integrity of the island following the Turkish 
invasion.  In his speech, Christofias calls the presence of the British troops “a colonial 
bloodstain” that needs to be removed in order to get the colonial Turkish troops to withdraw as 
well (Smith, 2008).  Based on this data, it appears that security hypothesis is not supported.  The 
President of Cyprus wants the troops removed since he considers them “a colonial bloodstain” 
and will pressure Turkey to remove their forces from the island as well (Smith, 2008).  Coupled 
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with Great Britain discussing base closures (Oliver and Smith, 2010), the data for security being 
a current factor in the explanation of  why Great Britain sided with the Republic of Cyprus 
during the offshore drilling dispute presents a problem. 
The results for the fourth hypothesis are mixed.  In the past, security played a crucial role 
in the relations between Great Britain and Cyprus.  However, the end of British colonialism 
coupled with the actions of Great Britain during the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent 
partition of the island has made security more of a problem as an explanatory variable.  The 
desire of the Republic of Cyprus to have the British withdraw in order to ensure a Turkish 
withdrawal, coupled with discussion in Great Britain to close its bases lends evidence to this 
assertion.  Based on the available evidence, it is safe to conclude that security played a negligible 
role in the decision of Great Britain to support the offshore exploration and drilling efforts by the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this case study was to answer the question why Great Britain sided with 
the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.  The answer was found by 
testing four hypotheses.  At first glance the first hypothesis was problematic since the ethnic 
makeups of the two states are not similar.  However, the hypothesis was validated when the 
impact of the Cypriot interest groups was taken into consideration.  The second hypothesis was 
true in explaining the relations between the two states at the beginning.  However, due to 
secularization in Great Britain, this hypothesis was not supported by the data.  The third 
hypothesis held potential since hydrocarbon rich Cyprus could buy the support of hydrocarbon 
poor Great Britain.  Ultimately, there was no data to support this hypothesis, though the results 
of the second concession could validate the hypothesis.  As with the second and third 
  
52 
hypotheses, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was a satisfactory explanation for 
relations between Cyprus and Great Britain from 1878 until 1974.  However, the results of the 
1974 invasion, ensuring the withdrawal of the Turkish military and budgetary problems 
demonstrates that in the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis, security played a negligible role as well.  
The analysis of this section supports the role of ethnicity, in the form of interest groups, in 
explaining the alignment of Great Britain with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot 
offshore drilling crisis.  See table 2 for a summary of the findings for the case of Great Britain.     
II. Greece 
 The second traditional actor that has become involved in the Cyprus drilling dispute is 
Greece.  The Hellenic government expressed its support for Cyprus stating that it is a right of the 
Republic to Cyprus to explore and develop its own resources (Papandreou, 2011; The National 
Herald, 2011).  This led to friction with Greece’s historic antagonist Turkey.  Due to the current 
financial crisis, Greece has tried to work with Turkey to figure out a compromise to the problem 
(Kumova, 2011), yet Greece has also accused Turkey of exasperating the situation and the Greek 
Government has called on Turkey to withdraw its exploratory team from the disputed waters 
(The National Herald, 2011; Cyprus News Agency, 2011).  It is apparent that Greece has sided 
with the Republic of Cyprus during the crisis.  Now it is time to understand why Greece supports 
the Republic of Cyprus during this dispute. 
Ethnicity 
 Some scholars believe that states form an alliance with another state during a dispute due 
to similar ethnicity (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 2004).  In order to determine if this has 
any bearing on this case, this theory has been incorporated into this analysis as hypothesis two.  
According to this hypothesis, if the ethnicity of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are similar 
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than this could account for why Greece chose to support the drilling rights of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  If the ethnicities are the same, then the speeches by the Greek government will be 
analyzed to see if ethnicity is cited as a reason for the support between the two states. 
 The first step is to identify if the ethnicity of the two countries are similar.  According to 
the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 97% of Greece’s population 
belongs to the Greek ethnic group.  The other 3% belong to various other ethnic groups (CIA 
World Factbook, 2011).  According to the Ethnic Encyclopedia of Europe, out of the population 
living in Greece, 60,000 hail from Cyprus (Cole, 2011).  This constitutes .0056% of Greece’s 
total population.  This is hardly enough to put pressure on the Greek government to support the 
Republic of Cyprus.  The Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus are ethnically Greek.  
According to the census data from the Central Intelligence Agency, 96% of the inhabitants of the 
Republic of Cyprus belong to the Greek ethnic group (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  From the 
data collected and analyzed, the dominant ethnicity of both states is Greek.  
 Since it has been established that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are constituted 
mainly of the Greek ethnic group, it is time to see if ethnicity is cited as a factor to why Greece 
supports the Republic of Cyprus during the drilling crisis.  The former Greek Prime Minister at 
the start of the crisis, Papandreou, was quoted saying the following at a press event “we have 
made a clear distinction between financial problems and national causes” (Papandreou, 2011). 
The term national has been italicized.  National in this context is another word for ethnicity.  
Prime Minister Papandreou and the Greek government have made similar statements in 
interviews with Today’s Zaman, The National Herald, and Cyprus News Agency (Kumova, 
2011; The National Herald, 2011; Cyprus News Agency, 2011).  This has followed the historical 
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record between the two.  Greece has been a strong supporter of the Republic of Cyprus due to 
their shared Greek ethnicity (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000).   
 One possible explanation for why Greece supports the drilling rights of the Republic of 
Cyprus would be their similar ethnicities.  The census data provided showed that both Greece 
and the Republic of Cyprus are mainly constituted of the Greek ethnic group.  Interviews and 
statements by the Greek government have supported this hypothesis.  Further evidence was 
provided by the historical narrative.  The analysis has lent evidence that ethnicity has been 
employed by Greece to justify their support of the Republic of Cyprus extracting the 
hydrocarbons off their coast. 
Religion 
Scholars in the field of alliances have theorized that similar religious beliefs can cause 
states to form alliances during a crisis (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000).  Due 
to the historical evidence that this factor contributed to alliance formation between Greece and 
the Republic of Cyprus, it has been incorporated as the third hypothesis in this study to 
determine if it still holds true.  In order to test this hypothesis, the religious identification of both 
states will be analyzed to see which religions, if any, both states share.  The analysis will also 
test to see if religion has become more or less prominent in the two states during a ten year 
period.  Finally, the actions and speeches of the leaders (both secular and religious) will be 
analyzed to determine if religion is responsible for Greece siding with the Republic of Cyprus 
during the drilling crisis. 
 In order to determine if the religious hypothesis is viable, it is important to understand if 
religion plays a crucial role in both states.  This will be determined by analyzing the growth, 
decline, or stability of religion in these two countries from 2000 to 2011. According to the data 
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provided by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2000, the religion of Cyprus was 96% Greek 
Orthodox Christian.  The other 4% were constituted of Maronite, Armenian Apostolic and other 
Christian faiths (CIA World Factbook, 2000).  The Central Intelligence Agency reported in 2011 
that the religious makeup of the Republic of Cyprus was 96% Greek Orthodox Christian.  The 
other 4% are Maronite, Armenian Apostolic and other Christian denominations (CIA World 
Factbook, 2011).  In 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that 98% of the population 
in Greece identified with the Greek Orthodox Church (CIA World Factbook, 2000).  In 2011, the 
Central Intelligence Agency reported that 98% of the Greek population adhered to the Greek 
Orthodox Church.  1.3% of the population identified themselves as Muslim, and .7% identified 
themselves as other (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  The data indicates that in both Greece and the 
Republic of Cyprus, Greek Orthodox Christianity has enjoyed high stable support.  This high 
level of adherents in both countries could be responsible for why Greece aligned with the 
Republic of Cyprus during the oil drilling crisis. 
 It is important to briefly discuss the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church.  The 
headquarters of the Church is located in Istanbul, Turkey.  The Patriarch of the Church, who is 
ethnically Greek, is required by Turkish law to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic.  Turkey has 
used this law to make sure that the Patriarch stays loyal to the Turkish state.  If there are 
problems with Greece or Cyprus, then the Patriarch is punished as was the case of the Hakki 
seminary closing (Demir and Gamm, 2011).  While the formal leadership has been mute on 
religious justifications, the Church leaders in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus along with their 
followers have not been neutral.  Reports from the European Commission and scholarly journals 
demonstrate that the countries of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are the most religious in 
Europe.  This has translated into policy as the people put their faith into practice (Stepan, 2000; 
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European Commission, 2005).  This is highly evident in Cyprus, where the first President was 
the archbishop of the island. Currently, the present archbishop of Cyprus is head of the right 
wing National People’s Front (ELAM) party and has close ties with Greece.  According to a 
report in The Greek Cypriot Daily, the Archbishop of Cyprus claims that the reason why Greece 
supported the Republic of Cyprus is due to their religious ties (Evripidou, 2010; Fox, 1993; 
Hakki, 2007).  While there are no interviews or statements issued by either the Greek or 
Republic of Cyprus governments indicating that religion is the cause for Greek support in this 
particular case, the historical evidence compiled indicates that this factor is a covert explanatory 
variable (Fox, 1993; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007).   
One possible explanation for why Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus during the 
oil drilling crisis is similar religious ties between the groups.  The data collected and analyzed 
showed that adherence to Greek Orthodox Christianity is high and is not in danger of decline 
anytime soon.  This has translated into political policy of supporting the other state in each in 
both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.  The data presented in this analysis seems to support 
the theory that religious ties are responsible for Greece supporting the Republic of Cyprus during 
the oil drilling crisis. 
Hydrocarbons 
 Another theory that hopes to explain the alignment of nations is hydrocarbons.  Instead of 
serving as an aggravating factor, scholars claim that a state can use its resources to entice a 
resource poor state into aligning with the resource rich state (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark 
et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).  This theory has been incorporated into 
this analysis via hypothesis three.  In order for this hypothesis to be viable, it must meet two 
conditions.  One, Greece must be poor in hydrocarbons (i.e. oil and natural gas) and the Republic 
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of Cyprus must be rich in those resources.  Two, there must be agreement between the two states 
for oil and natural gas to flow to Greece in return for Greece’s assistance in supporting the 
Republic of Cyprus right to extract those resources.  If both of these conditions are present, then 
this hypothesis is a supporting factor for why Greece supported the Republic of Cyprus during 
the oil drilling crisis. 
 In order to test the utility of the third hypothesis in this case, it is imperative to show a 
need of hydrocarbons (i.e. oil and natural gas) in Greece.  According to the geological reports of 
International Energy Agency, Energy Delta Institute, and the Central Intelligence Agency, it is 
made known that Greece is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon imports.  Their only petroleum 
deposit is in the Prinos field in the Aegean, and it only produces 1 kb/d, far short of satisfying the 
demand of the island.  They are entirely energy dependent and must primarily rely on Russia for 
their energy needs.  They have to import over 99% of their hydrocarbon needs from Russia (CIA 
World Factbook, 2011; Oil and Gas Security, 2010; Energy Delta Institute, 2011).  The data 
shows that Greece is poor in hydrocarbons.  This translates into support for the first half of part 
one of the hypothesis to be viable.  In order for the second part of the first condition to hold true, 
the Republic of Cyprus must be rich enough in hydrocarbons to export to others.  Analyzing the 
geological reports released by the British Broadcasting Company, Jerusalem Post, and Defence 
Greece shows that the 7 trillion cubic feet of reserves located in Block 12 are enough to meet the 
energy needs of the Republic of Cyprus as well as export these hydrocarbons to other states 
(BBC, 2011; Jerusalem Post, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011a).  The data supports the first 
condition in making the third hypothesis viable.  Now the second condition will be tested to see 
if the third hypothesis is viable in this case. 
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 In order for the second condition to be met, there must be an agreement between Greece 
and the Republic of Cyprus for the Republic of Cyprus to supply hydrocarbons to Greece.  There 
are two oil refineries in Greece:  one in Aspropyrgos owned by Hellenic Petroleum which 
processes 7.5 million tons annually (Hellenic Petroleum, 2012), the other in Corinth is operated 
by Motor Oil Hellas and has the capacity to refine 100,000 barrels per day (Motor Oil Hellas, 
2012).  Both of which can be used to refine the hydrocarbons extracted from the Republic of 
Cyprus.  This is important for the Republic of Cyprus since their refinery capabilities are limited 
to only one refinery (Cyprus Petroleum Refinery, 2012).  While it is too early to determine if 
Greece will receive Cypriot hydrocarbons or will be allowed to refine it, there is evidence this 
will be the case.  When Israel developed its hydrocarbons, Israel sent those resources to Greece 
to be refined.  Israel also opened a market with Greece allowing Greece to purchase Israeli 
hydrocarbons.  In return, Israel has cultivated a new alliance (Pruder, 2011).  The case with Israel 
parallels the case with Cyprus, so it will be no surprise if the Republic of Cyprus allows Greece 
to refine some of their oil and open up Greek markets for Cypriot energy. 
 The goal of this section of the analysis was to determine if the third hypothesis, 
hydrocarbon trade, had any bearing on Greece aligning with the Republic of Cyprus during the 
offshore drilling crisis.  In order for the hypothesis to be viable two conditions had to be met:  
Greece needed to be energy poor and Cyprus needed to be energy rich, and in exchange for 
Greek help Greece would receive Cypriot oil.  The data shows support for the first condition.  
While the data is not completely present for the second condition, there is enough secondary 
evidence that it will be borne out in the near future.  The analysis, thereby concludes, that there is 
support for the third hypothesis in being a contributing factor explaining the alignment of Greece 
with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. 
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Security 
 One of the main reasons cited for alliance formation is security reasons (Davis and 
Moore, 1997; Burg and Shoup, 1999).  It would be remiss if such an important factor was not 
incorporated into this analysis.  In order to determine if this security theory explains this case, it 
has been incorporated into the study as the fourth hypothesis.  In order for this hypothesis to be 
viable in this case study; conditions must be met.  The first condition is determining if the 
Republic of Cyprus faces a security threat; the second is whether Greece can provide the security 
to offset the threat to the Republic of Cyprus, and the third condition is that Greece is willing to 
provide security to the Republic of Cyprus to eliminate the security threat.  If all these conditions 
are met, then the fourth hypothesis is viable in explaining why Greece aligned itself with the 
Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. 
 In order to test the fourth hypothesis, the three conditions need to be tested.  The first 
condition tested is determining if the Republic of Cyprus faces a security threat.  There is 
evidence to support this is the case.  Scholarly reports suggest the presence of Turkish troops in 
Northern Cyprus is viewed by the Southern Cypriots as a threat to their national sovereignty 
(Ker-Lindsey and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007).  The statement 
made by the Turkish government to the British Broadcasting Company that "[t]his work will be 
carried out together with the [navy] escort," increases Cyprus’ fear of Turkish military 
intervention to prevent their desire to become energy dependent (BBC, 2011).  According to a 
report published in Al Jazeera, “the Turkish Piri Reis was sailing in international waters south of 
Cyprus, about 80km away from a Greek Cypriot gas rig and between two plots that Cyprus has 
mapped out for exploration” (Al Jazeera, 2011)  This caused concern for the security of the 
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Republic of Cyprus’ drilling platforms.  The evidence supports the first condition that the 
Republic of Cyprus is facing a security threat. 
 The second condition tested in order to determine the viability of the fourth hypothesis is 
if Greece can provide the support necessary to address this crisis.  The answer is found in the 
Treaty of Guarantee and in the historical relations between the two states.  According to the 
Treaty of Guarantee, “[i]n so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of 
the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-
establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty” (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960).  This 
means that Greece has an obligation under international law to intervene to protect the interests 
of the Greek Cypriots.  The Republic of Cyprus has also counted on the Greek government to 
extend diplomatic pressure to keep them secure.  This has been historically manifested in 
Greece’s voice in the European Union (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005).  The data 
obtained from the Treaty of Guarantee and other historical documents supports the second 
condition that Greece can provide support to the Republic of Cyprus to help alleviate security 
concerns. 
 The third, and final, condition that is tested in order to determine the viability of the 
fourth hypothesis is if Greece has tangibly supported the Republic of Cyprus.  In regard to 
military assistance, Greece has failed to deliver.  Greece has not sent troops to the island, despite 
the invitation from Turkey during the communal violence (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and 
Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000).  During the offshore drilling crisis, Greece has not extended 
military support to the Republic of Cyprus to defend their offshore drilling.  However, Greece 
has extended diplomatic pressure on Turkey in order to achieve Turkish retreat from drilling in 
Cypriot waters.  The Greek government has issued many statements to Today’s Zaman, The 
  
61 
National Herald, and the Cyprus News Agency indicating that they are putting diplomatic 
pressure on Turkey not to harass the offshore drilling conducted by the Republic of Cyprus.  
Here is an example of a statement from the Greek Foreign Minister to The National Herald:  
“Recent Turkish statements and actions in response to Cyprus’ sovereign right to exploit its 
natural resources are in conflict with international law and order and undermine stability in the 
region, causing grave concern” (Kumova, 2011; Papandreou, 2011; The National Herald, 2011; 
Cyprus News Agency, 2011).  However, this has been a lukewarm response.  The Greek 
Government toned down their rhetoric in order to continue their thaw in relations with Turkey.  
This is evidenced by a report in Today’s Zaman and the Daily Hurriyet that neither side wants 
this crisis to stall their talks on normalization of relations (Kumova, 2011; Kanli, 2011).    Based 
on these interviews and reports, this hypothesis is problematic. With regard to military 
assistance, Greece has not provided any assistance and in regard to diplomatic assistance, 
Greece’s response has been lukewarm. 
Conclusion 
 This section of the analysis has answered the question why Greece sided with the 
Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.  The answer was found by testing the four 
hypotheses.  The data supported the claim that ethnic similarity was responsible for Greece 
supporting the right of Cyprus to explore and exploit its offshore resources.  The data regarding 
religion showed support for the religious hypothesis being viable in this case.  For the third 
hypothesis, the conditions are there also to make it plausible.  However, it is too soon to say with 
complete certainty that hydrocarbons are the reason Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus 
during the offshore drilling crisis.  Finally, the data found that the Republic of Cyprus’ security is 
threatened and that they look to Greece for protection.  The Greek response has been mixed.  
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Greece has not provided military assistance to protect the offshore drilling platforms of the 
Republic of Cyprus, and has exerted only gentle diplomatic pressure on Turkey to protect its 
ally.  See table 3 for a summary of the findings for the case of Greece. 
III. Turkey 
 As in the previous case studies of Great Britain and Greece, diplomatic pressure was 
exerted to try to settle the offshore drilling dispute favoring the Republic of Cyprus (The 
National Herald, 2011).  The remaining three case studies differ in the means of their support for 
their respective sides.  They have utilized more tangible means of support for their respective 
allies (mainly the employment of force).  Turkey entered the Cypriot offshore drilling dispute on 
the side of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  Since they are not a signatory to the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Seas, Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus’ claims to 
its offshore hydrocarbons (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, 1982; BBC, 2011).   After 
signing an agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkey dispatched its own 
hydrocarbon exploration vessel to Cypriot waters to explore and recover any hydrocarbons they 
could find.  Turkey also dispatched naval vessels to protect this expedition from interference 
from the Republic of Cyprus or any other foreign party (Al Jazeera, 2011; BBC, 2011).  The 
question needs to be answered, why did Turkey support the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus during this dispute?  The answer comes again by testing the four hypotheses of this 
analysis. 
Ethnicity 
 Ethnicity is an important construct.  It is useful as an explanatory variable for various 
political policies.  Such is the case with alliances.  Some scholars believe that ethnicity is the 
main cause for alliance formation (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004).  As 
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such, this concept was incorporated into this analysis via hypothesis one.  In order for this 
hypothesis to be a viable explanation of the actions of Turkey aligning with the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus, two conditions need to be met.  The first condition is to prove that the ethnic 
compositions of both countries are similar.  The second condition is that there must be evidence, 
both historical and present, to support the claim that Turkey allied with the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus due to ethnic similarity.  If both of these conditions are met, then ethnicity is a 
plausible explanation for why Turkey entered the Cypriot offshore drilling dispute on the side of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
 The testing of the hypothesis will proceed in two parts.  The first part is to examine the 
data to see if the first condition of ethnic similarity is verified.  According to the census 
information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the ethnic composition of Turkey is as 
follows:  75% Turkish, 18% Kurdish, and 7% other.  According to the census data provided by 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the ethnic composition of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is 99% (conservative estimate) Turkish (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  There are also a 
large number of expatriates living in each country.  Ever since Turkey recognized the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus in the 1980s, Turkish immigration has increased to the island (Ker-
Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008).  There has also been a significant 
migration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey.  According to the recent census data provided by the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it is estimated that there are between 300,000 to 500,000 
Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey (TRNC Info, 2001).  So, the data has supported the first 
condition that there is strong ethnic similarity between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus.  In addition, the significant expatriate communities living in the other country 
cements the bond between the two states. 
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 Now that the data has been presented to support the first condition, one can move on to 
test the second condition. Historical and current evidence will be examined to see if ethnicity has 
any impact on Turkey aligning with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  Examining the 
historical record, one finds data that supports the second condition of the first hypothesis.  The 
Treaty of Guarantee allows for Turkey to protect its ethnic kin in Cyprus “[i]n so far as common 
or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the 
right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present 
Treaty” (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960).  Turkey has justified its numerous interventions on the 
island of Cyprus as protecting their ethnic brothers (Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000; Fox, 1993; 
Landau, 1981).  While the Turkish leaders have not stated outright that the reason for their 
support is due to ethnic similarities, one can see that ethnicity is implicit in their statements of 
support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  Turkey has claimed the acts of the 
Republic of Cyprus are “provocative” and they will take the necessary steps to protect the 
interests of the ethnic kin on Cyprus to both the British Broadcasting Company and to Al Jazeera 
(BBC, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011).  From the evidence gathered, there is support for the second 
condition of the first hypothesis. 
 In order for the first hypothesis to be viable in this particular case study two conditions 
had to be met.  The first condition was that the ethnic composition of the two states had to be 
similar.  The evidence suggests that this is the case.  The second condition that had to be met was 
that the leaders employed ethnicity to justify their actions.  Both historical and present day 
evidence suggests that this condition has been met.  Therefore, it is safe to conclude that 
ethnicity plays a role in explaining why Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.  While ethnicity has played a role, it is 
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important to test the other hypotheses to determine if they also can explain Turkey’s alliance 
with the Turks of Cyprus. 
Religion 
 Religion has commonly been neglected as a factor in the studies dealing with alliance 
formation.  However, it has been making a comeback as an important variable in the 
consideration of alliance formations (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000).  Thus, it 
has been incorporated into the analysis via hypothesis two.  In order for this hypothesis to be 
plausible in explaining why Turkey chose to ally with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
three conditions need to be met.  The first condition is that the confessional adherence of both 
states is similar.  The second condition that needs to be met is that the number of adherents to the 
shared religion must be high.  The third condition is that the leaders of the two states use this 
high level of religious similarity in explaining their alliance.  If all these conditions are met, then 
the second hypothesis is viable in explaining this particular case study. 
 The first condition tested is religious similarity.  According to the religious data compiled 
by the Central Intelligence Agency, both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
adhere to Sunni Islam (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  Therefore, the first condition is most 
definitely met.  The second condition that needs to be met is that there are a high number of 
adherents of Sunni Islam in both countries.  In order to test the viability of this hypothesis, a ten 
year period will be examined.  This examination will show if there is a change in religious 
adherents as well as how these numbers correspond to the government basing policy on religious 
justifications. According to the religious data from the Central Intelligence Agency, in Turkey, 
99.8% of the population adheres to Sunni Islam.  This has been constant over a ten year period.  
The census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and travel guides demonstrate that 
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for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 99% of the population adheres to Sunni Islam.  
This has also been constant over a ten year period (CIA World Factbook, 2000; Darke, 2009; CIA 
World Factbook, 2011).  This data supports the presence of high levels of Sunni Islam adherents 
in both countries and that the number has been stable over a ten- year period.  As a result, the 
data presented here supports the first and second conditions needed to make the second 
hypothesis viable.  Now that the two conditions are present in this case, it is time to test the third 
condition. 
 In order for the third condition to be viable, the high numbers of Sunni Muslims in both 
countries needs to translate to policy justifications for supporting the alliance.  At first glance this 
would appear to be a problem due to Turkey’s secular constitution.  However, one notices a shift 
in Turkey’s orientation towards religion in the governmental sector.  When the Islamic 
sympathetic AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in the 2003 elections, Turkey 
became more religious in its outlook.  Restrictions against Muslims were either eased or lifted 
entirely and the foreign policy of the AKP administration became involved with the Muslim 
countries across the globe.  In his book, Foreign Minister Davutoglu explains the case for using 
Islam to justify Turkey’s involvement with the East (Tepe, 2005; Ozbudun, 2006; Davutoglu, 
2001).  The data supports the third condition for Turkey presently, but in order for it to truly 
work it must also be present in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  According to the 1997 
report in the Freedom of Religion and Belief:  A World Report, while 99% of Turkish Cypriots 
adhere to Sunni Islam, they are largely secular and do not use religion to justify government 
policy (Boyle and Sheen, 1997).  As such, the third condition is not viable since it can not 
account for the actions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  The result being, that no 
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documents (either news media or historical) could be located to demonstrate that the alliance 
between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is grounded in religion. 
 The second hypothesis of this analysis holds that religion could be a reason why Turkey 
sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.  In order 
for this hypothesis to be viable, it had to meet three conditions.  The first condition was that there 
had to be similarity between the religions of the two states.  The data proved that there are indeed 
religious similarities between the two.  The second condition that had to be met was that there 
had to be high levels of adherents.  This is needed in order for religion to shape public policy.  
The census data collected supported the second condition.  The third, and final condition, held 
that religion had to play into the policies of both states.  The historical data shows that this is true 
for Turkey in the present, but can not account for past support when Turkey was a secular state 
(Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000).  The data from the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus regarding the tie of religion and state does not support the third 
condition.  Since the third condition did not hold, religion is not considered a strong explanatory 
variable for this particular case. 
Hydrocarbons 
 Natural resources are one of the most studied causes of conflict.  However, some scholars 
believe that resource trade can lead to the formation of alliances between states (Ross, 2004; 
Russett, 1981; Klare, 2001; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa 
and Mansfield, 1993).  As a result, this notion that hydrocarbons can be used to form alliances 
has been incorporated into this analysis as hypothesis three.  In order for this hypothesis to be 
viable in explaining why Turkey allied with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the 
offshore drilling crisis, certain conditions will need to be met.  The first condition that needs to 
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be met is to show that Turkey is hydrocarbon poor and that the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus is hydrocarbon rich.  The second condition is that there must be an agreement between 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey for the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus to provide hydrocarbons to Turkey in exchange for protection of their offshore 
hydrocarbons.  If both of these conditions are met, then the third hypothesis could be viable.  
 In order for the hypothesis to be viable, conditions must be established.  The first 
condition is that Turkey must be hydrocarbon poor and that the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus must have enough hydrocarbons to export to Turkey to entice their support for their 
offshore drilling.  According to the geological reports published by Cooley, Starr, Cornell, and 
Shaffer, Turkey is indeed hydrocarbon poor.  According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Turkey has to import its entire demand of hydrocarbons from Iran, the Caspian Sea, and 
from Russia (Cooley, 2008; Starr and Cornell, 2005; Shaffer, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2011).  Due to being energy poor, Turkey is constantly looking for markets to fulfill its energy 
needs.  According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this is a top priority for the state of 
Turkey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).   As such, the first factor to proving condition one is 
present.  In order for the second factor to be present, data needs to be presented to show that the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will have enough hydrocarbons for its own needs and 
enough to export to Turkey.  According to preliminary geological results released to the British 
Broadcasting Company, Al Jazeera, and Today’s Zaman, the 7 trillion cubic feet of 
hydrocarbons is enough to meet this condition (BBC, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011; Today’s Zaman, 
2011b).  Therefore, the geological data shows that the two factors are present, thereby making 
condition one probable.  
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 Now that it has been established that condition one for the first hypothesis exists, it is 
imperative to test the second condition.  In order for this condition to hold true there must be an 
agreement between the two states for the transfer of the offshore resources.  The government of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has signed an agreement with the government of 
Turkey allowing Turkey to drill its offshore resources.  This was reported by the major news 
media the British Broadcasting Company and Al Jazeera (BBC, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011).  
According to a report released to the Todays’ Zaman, the deal allows Turkey to market the 
extracted resources (presumably for their own consumption) and provide just compensation to 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Today’s Zaman, 2011b).  The data provided by the 
British Broadcasting Company, Al Jazeera, and Today’s Zaman supports the second condition 
needed for the third hypothesis to be viable in this particular case. 
 In order to incorporate the idea that hydrocarbons can be used to create alliances, the 
third hypothesis of this analysis was formulated.  It holds true that a resource rich state can use 
its resources to attract other states into joining an alliance.  In order for this hypothesis to be 
viable two conditions had to be met.  The first condition was establishing that the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus is rich in hydrocarbon and that Turkey is poor in hydrocarbon.  The 
data collected and analyzed supports this condition.  The second condition that needed to be met 
is an agreement between the two parties ensuring Northern Cypriot energy in return for Turkish 
assistance.  The data collected and analyzed supports this condition as well.  Since the evidence 
supports both of the conditions, hypothesis three is a viable explanation as to why Turkey allied 
with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. 
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Security 
 The next hypothesis tested in this study deals with security.  .  In order for this hypothesis 
to be viable in explaining Turkey’s alliance with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
during the offshore drilling crisis, three conditions need to be met.  The first condition is 
determining if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus faced a security threat that caused it to 
call on Turkey for assistance.  The second condition is determining if Turkey can provide said 
assistance.  The third, and final, condition is if Turkey acts to protect the interests of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.  If all three conditions are met, then this hypothesis is viable in 
explaining this particular case. 
 In order for the fourth hypothesis to apply to this particular case, the first condition needs 
to be met.  It is necessary to demonstrate that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus faces a 
security threat.  This can be accomplished by examining the historical and present evidence.  
Ever since declaring independence, the Turkish Cypriots have felt that they are being 
discriminated against at best and persecuted against by the Greeks at worst.  This situation led to 
their attempts to create their own republic in order to feel secure (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000; 
Hakki, 2007).  This fear of Greek domination continues to the present and has recently 
manifested itself over Turkish Cypriot concerns about offshore drilling conducted by the 
Republic of Cyprus.  The Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots will not give them their 
fair share of the oil proceeds.  This is demonstrated by the following interview published in the 
Daily Hurriyet:  “Greek Cypriot leader Demetrius Christofias “generously” ultimately agreed 
that if gas was to be found, the share of Turkish Cypriots would be 20 percent; American friends, 
however, have suggested that Turkish Cypriots should be given a full 50 percent share in any 
find off the island” (Kanli, 2011).  This demonstrates that the Turkish Cypriots believe that the 
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Greek Cypriots are trying to deny them their fair share of the hydrocarbons.  The historical data 
along with the interview found in the Daily Hurriyet, demonstrates that the first condition is 
present. 
 The second condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to show the fourth hypothesis is 
plausible is that Turkey be willing to provide assistance to the Turkish government of Northern 
Cyprus.  The answer can be found in the Treaty of Guarantee.  This treaty allows Turkey to 
intervene on the island in order to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots:  “[i]n so far as 
common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers 
reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by 
the present Treaty (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960).  Throughout the relations between the two states, 
Turkey has shown a willingness to come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots.  This has come in the 
forms of the 1974 invasion to protect the Turkish Cypriots and utilizing diplomatic techniques to 
ensure the protection of the Turkish Cypriots (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; 
Borowiec, 2000).  This has also manifested during the offshore drilling crisis, as the government 
of Turkey has exerted influence on the Greek government in order to stabilize the region.  This 
was evidenced by a report to Today’s Zaman:  “Turkish Deputy Prime Minister for Cypriot 
Affairs Beşir Atalay, meanwhile, considered the Turkish initiative on Thursday a move to protect 
the rights of Turkish Cypriots, for whom Turkey acts as a guarantor state”   (Kumova, 2011).  
This statement demonstrates that Turkey is willing to provide assistance in order to ensure the 
security of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
 The third and final condition that needs to be met is that Turkey must be willing to extend 
diplomatic and other tangible assistance to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in order to 
offset their security dilemma.  It first needs to be demonstrated that Northern Cyprus is essential 
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to Turkish security as well.  Studies have found that the Turkish government believes that 
Cyprus is key at securing its borders from a possible Greek and Israeli threat (Ruysdael and 
Yucel, 2002; Larrabee, 2007).  Due to a lapse in relations with Israel, Turkey believes that 
Israel’s alliance with the Republic of Cyprus is a security threat.  This is according to reports 
released by Debkafile and from the Turkish government’s interview with Today’s Zaman.   “An 
Israeli military helicopter also flew over the Turkish research ship, Piri Reis, on Thursday night, 
according to the daily, as it was in the Aphrodite gas field, off Cyprus' southern coast and 
adjacent to the larger Leviathan field. The helicopter flew low over the ship for a long time, the 
report said” (Debkafile, 2011; Today’s Zaman, 2011a).  The presence of Israel’s military poses a 
security threat to Turkey.  Now that it is established that Northern Cyprus is vital to Turkish 
security, the test of the third condition can commence.  Turkey has shown that it is willing to 
send forces to Northern Cyprus to defend the interests of the Turkish Cypriots living there 
(Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005, Borowiec, 2000).  Scholarly reports show that the Turkish 
military maintains 17,000 troops (reduced from 40,000, but still more than the Greek Cypriot 
forces) on the island to defend the northern government from attack (Ker-Lindsey and Webb, 
2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007).  As recent events have demonstrated, 
Turkey has also sent its navy to protect the offshore resources of the Northern Turkish Republic 
of Cyprus as both the British Broadcasting Company and Al Jazeera have reported (BBC, 2011; 
Al Jazeera, 2011).  According to this evidence, the third condition has been verified in this case.  
 The idea that security can be an explanatory factor in the alliance of Turkey with the 
government of Northern Cyprus has been incorporated into the analysis as the fourth hypothesis.  
In order for this hypothesis to be viable for this case, three conditions had to be met:  1) Northern 
Cyprus had to face a security threat, 2) Turkey had to be willing to provide assistance, and 3) 
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Turkey had to act to protect Northern Cyprus.  The data collected and analyzed showed that all 
three apply.  As such, it is safe to conclude that security reasons are at least, in part, responsible 
for Turkey aligning with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling 
crisis. 
Conclusion  
 This case study attempted to answer the question of why Turkey sided with the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.  Four possible explanations were 
identified.  These possible explanations were incorporated into hypotheses and tested.  The 
results supported the first hypothesis that ethnic similarities are responsible for the alliance.  
Hypothesis three (hydrocarbon trade) and hypothesis four (security) were also validated by the 
data in this analysis.  However, there was insufficient evidence that hypothesis two (religion) is 
responsible for the alliance.  Therefore, the reason for Turkey’s support of the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis is found in ethnic similarities, hydrocarbon 
trade, and security hypotheses.  See table 4 for a summary of the findings for the case of Turkey. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The New Actors:  Russia and Israel 
 
 The previous case studies (Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey) are the traditional actors 
considered when analyzing the Cypriot conflict (Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007).  However, the 
offshore drilling crisis has brought two new actors to the arena:  Russia and Israel.  Unlike the 
actions of Great Britain and Greece who took a more diplomatic stance, Russia and Israel (like 
Turkey) have pledged military forces to protect the drilling interests of the Republic of Cyprus 
(Defence Greece, 2011a; Fenwick, 2011).  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
motivations of these states in their alliance with the Republic of Cyprus during this crisis.  This 
chapter of the analysis tests the four hypotheses in order to understand their choice of alliance 
during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.  The results contribute to the current literature dealing 
with the Cyprus conflict by examining the motivations of the two newest players.  The first actor 
examined is Russia. 
I. Russia 
 Russia’s involvement with Cyprus is relatively new.  True, Moscow recognizes the 
Republic of Cyprus as a state and has a diplomatic mission in Nicosia (Drath, 2008).  However, 
Russia has not played a significant role in the Cyprus conflict until now.  This changed when 
Dimitry Christofias was elected President of Cyprus in 2008.  President Christofias is the leader
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of the communist AKEL party.  During his youth, Christofias studied in Moscow.  Due to these 
connections, Christofias has warm relations with the Kremlin (Drath, 2008; Dunphy and Bale, 
2007).  The election of Christofias is the trigger that opened the door for more Russian 
involvement in the Republic of Cyprus.  When the Republic of Cyprus began drilling in Block 
12 and Turkey was threatening their drilling activities, Russia extended diplomatic support as 
well as dispatching two submarines and its sole carrier group in support of the claims made by 
the Republic of Cyprus (Fenwick, 2011; Debkafile; 2012; Defence Greece, 2011).  This begs the 
question, why did Russia enter the fray on the side of the Republic of Cyprus?  The answer could 
partially be found by Christofias’ warm relations with Moscow; however, it does not adequately 
explain Russian motivations.  In order to determine those motivations, the four hypotheses will 
be examined.  
Ethnicity 
 As it has been discussed in previous case studies, ethnicity is an important variable in 
explaining the formation of alliances (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 2004).  Following the 
path of the previous case studies, this theory has been incorporated into the analysis as 
hypothesis one.  In order for this hypothesis to be viable in explaining why Russia allied with the 
Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, it must meet several conditions.  The first 
condition to be met is to determine if the ethnicity of the two states are similar.  If it is, then the 
second step is to determine if ethnicity has been employed as a justification for the response of 
Russia.  If the ethnicity is not the same between the two states, then it is imperative to examine 
the other ways in which ethnicity can be used to gain an alliance (i.e. ethnic lobby groups).   
  
76 
 The first step in determining the viability of the ethnic hypothesis is to determine if the 
majority ethnic groups of each state compliments the other.  According to the census data 
available from the Central Intelligence Agency, for the Republic of Cyprus, 97% of the 
population is Greek and the other 3% is distributed among other ethnic groups (CIA World 
Factbook, 2011).  According to the census conducted by the Republic of Cyprus in 2001, there 
were 4,952 Russians living in Cyprus (Population Census, 2001).  According to the Famagusta 
Gazette by 2011 that number has increased to 100,000 (Ament, 2011).  This means that Russians 
compose 8.9% of the population of Cyprus.  Ethnic Russians comprise 79.8% of the population 
and 12.1% of the population belonged to other ethnicities in the Russian Federation (CIA World 
Factbook, 2011).  According to the census data for Russia compiled by the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the number of Greek Cypriots living in Russia is negligible for the purposes of this 
study (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  The census data illustrates that the first condition is not 
present in this case.  However, ethnicity can play a role in other ways. 
 Another way in which ethnicity plays a role is via ethnic lobbies.  This theory holds that 
if there is a powerful ethnic lobby in a country, it can persuade the host country to enact friendly 
policies towards the host state of that ethnic lobby (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Lohmann, 1998).  
In order for this condition to be met, it must be demonstrated that there is a powerful Cypriot 
lobby in Russia.  Conducting a search via the main internet search engines, LexisNexis, and the 
major world and regional news media, no evidence could be found of a Cypriot lobby in Russia.  
While it appears that this information has disproved the hypothesis, there is still another test that 
needs to be performed.  As demonstrated earlier in the census report published by the Famagusta 
Gazette, Russians currently make up 8.9% of the population of Cyprus (Ament, 2011).  The 
government of Russia has demonstrated their willingness to get involved in the affairs of other 
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states in order to protect the ethnic Russians living abroad.  In fact, this is built into their 
constitution.  However, this is somewhat of a problem, as this clause was meant to only protect 
the ethnic Russians living in the “Near Abroad” (Stone and Dennis, 2003; Porter and Saivetz, 
1994; Kolsto, 1999).  In addition, there were no speeches or policy statements that indicated that 
Russia intervened due to this clause in their constitution. 
 The first hypothesis held that if there was ethnic similarity between the two states, then 
this could be an explanation for the formation of their alliance.  In order for this hypothesis to be 
viable, it had to meet certain conditions.  The first condition was not met since the majority 
ethnic groups of the two states are different (Greek and Russian).  Ethnic lobbying was also 
examined to see if it was a viable explanation.  It was discounted due to the lack of a Cypriot 
lobby in Russia.  A promising bit of data surfaced about Russia intervening to protect the 
interests of Russians living abroad.  However, there was no evidence to back this claim.  This has 
led to the conclusion that the first hypothesis is not viable in explaining why Russia sided with 
the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. 
Religion 
 As previously noted, religion has been making a comeback in the field of alliance 
formation.  Some scholars argue that religion can be used to explain alliance formation.  These 
scholars contend that states will form an alliance with another co-religion in order to protect 
them from the influence of an alien religion (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000).  
This analysis recognizes the potential of religion as an explanatory factor in this analysis, so it 
has been incorporated as the second hypothesis.  In order for this hypothesis to be viable, it must 
meet three conditions.  The first is that the religions of the Republic of Cyprus and Russia are the 
same.  Second, it must be demonstrated that religious adherence is high and constant over a ten 
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year period.  This strengthens the use of religion being used to satisfy the hearts of the masses.  
Finally, religion must be used as a justification for Russia allying with the Republic of Cyprus 
during the offshore drilling crisis. 
 In order for the second hypothesis to be viable, it must first meet the first condition.  
According to the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 15-20% of Russia’s 
population adheres to Orthodox Christianity.  In the Republic of Cyprus, 96% of the population 
adheres to Orthodox Christianity (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  At first this appears to be 
problematic; however, since Orthodox Christianity is the majority religion of both states the 
second condition will be examined.  According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence 
Agency, in 2000 the percentage of the Russian population that adhered to Orthodox Christianity 
was estimated between 15-20%.  The Republic of Cyprus also held steady at 96% (CIA World 
Factbook, 2000).  While it shows that the adherence to Orthodox Christianity has been stable for 
a decade, the data also shows that Orthodox Christianity has never enjoyed the majority of the 
Russian population adhering to its faith since the fall of communism.  From the data presented 
here, it appears that the first and second conditions have been discounted.  However, on the elite 
level this hypothesis could still be viable. 
 In order for the third condition (or elite factor) to be viable it must be demonstrated that 
the Russian leaders have employed Orthodox Christianity as a means for Russian support for the 
Republic of Cyprus.  According to a report published by the Daily Hurriyet, during his first visit 
to the island, the first by a Russian leader in Cypriot history:  “Medvedev said that Russia and 
Greek Cyprus remained bound by a shared Orthodox Christian religion and that Moscow would 
do all in its power to support Greek Cypriots secure a just resolution of the island's 36-year 
division” (Hurriyet, 2010).  During the offshore drilling crisis, Russia again cited support for the 
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Republic of Cyprus due to their shared Orthodox Christian beliefs.  The Russians stated that they 
will protect their fellow Orthodox Christians from Islamic Turkey’s encroachment on their 
offshore energy reserves.  This statement was found in an interview with Pravda. According to 
him (Medvedev), Russia's relations with Cyprus "have always been very good, spiritually close 
and based on mutual respect and friendship” (Pravda, 2011).  Again spiritual similarity has been 
given as a justification of the alliance between the Republic of Cyprus and Russia.  From the data 
compiled from the Daily Hurriyet and Pravda, it appears that not only is the third condition 
viable, but that the whole hypothesis is supported by this evidence. 
 These statements by the Russian government could be viewed as a problem.  There is 
evidence that Russia has not claimed similar religious ties as a reason to intervene in the affairs 
of Ukraine, and the other former Soviet Republics.  However, Russia has a strong historical 
legacy of using religion in regards to opposing Turkey.  In order to gain more territory from the 
Ottoman Empire, Russia would claim that it was intervening to protect their fellow Orthodox 
Christians from Muslim exploitation.  There was also the claim that Russia was the successor of 
the Byzantine Empire due to the marriage between the ruler of Russia and a Byzantine princess.  
Therefore, Russia had an obligation to intervene in the lands they claimed were their own 
(Bugbee, 1877; Huntington, 1997).   
 It was claimed that in order for the second hypothesis to be viable in explaining why 
Russia allied with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, three conditions had 
to be met.  The first condition was that the religions of the two states had to be similar.  It was a 
stretch but this was proven to be the case.  The second condition stated that religion had to be 
important.  This was not upheld by the data.  The third condition was to be upheld only if 
religion was cited as a reason for Russia’s actions in supporting the Republic of Cyprus.  The 
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data collected and analyzed shows this is the case.  As a result, it is safe to conclude that the 
second hypothesis is viable in explaining this case. 
Hydrocarbons 
 The first hypothesis of the non-culture aspect of the theory focuses on the role of 
hydrocarbons.  Scholars have argued that a state can use its abundant resources in order to gain 
allies for their cause (Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).  This has been incorporated into 
the analysis as the third hypothesis.  Like the other hypotheses tested in this analysis, certain 
conditions have to be met in order to show that this hypothesis is viable in explaining this case.  
The first step is to demonstrate that the Republic of Cyprus has enough hydrocarbons to entice 
other states to support their claims.  The second step is to show that Russia is in need of Cypriot 
energy.  Finally, this must translate to justifying Russia’s intervention on the side of the Republic 
of Cyprus (i.e. concessions).  If all these conditions are met, then this is a viable hypothesis. 
 To begin with, the first condition will be tested to see if it is present.  Geological reports 
released by the British Broadcasting Company, Jerusalem Post, and Defence Greece have shown 
that the 7 trillion cubic feet of hydrocarbons located off the Republic of Cyprus is enough to 
fulfill their own energy needs, as well has having excess to export to the international market 
(BBC, 2011; Jerusalem Post, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011a).  This satisfies the criteria of the 
first condition.  The second condition is more of an issue.  It holds that Russia must be in need of 
Cypriot energy due to its low hydrocarbon production.  The geological data shows that this is not 
the case.  According to the reports compiled by Milov et al and Stulberg, Russia is a net exporter 
of oil and natural gas due to their reserves of 45 trillion cubic meters.  They have built numerous 
pipelines to export their energy to international markets (Milov et al, 2007; Stulberg, 2007).  
Since the second condition is problematic, what about the third?  In order for this condition to 
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hold true, there must be a concession by the Republic of Cyprus towards Russia for offshore 
drilling.  The data supports this condition.  According to a report released to Asia News, 
“Moscow also wants some licenses to develop some of the fields and is in favour of a 
cooperation agreement with Cyprus” (Asia News, 2011).  It is still too early to determine if the 
concession is to a state owned company or if it will be taken in conjunction with other western 
based companies.  Given this evidence, when the second round of concessions is announced later 
in 2012, Russia will have an advantage due to their support of Cyprus during this crisis. 
 The third hypothesis holds that a hydrocarbon rich state will use its resources to entice 
other states to join in an alliance.  In order for this hypothesis to be a viable explanation for this 
case, three conditions had to be met.  The first was to demonstrate that the Republic of Cyprus 
had enough hydrocarbons to export.  The geological and news media data supported this 
condition.  The second condition was not as clear-cut.  In order for it to be viable, Russia needed 
to be hydrocarbon poor and the geological data shows that it is not.  The third condition was 
tested anyway.  It was validated by the fact Russia is asking for an offshore drilling concession in 
response to its support of the Republic of Cyprus.  When the second round of concessions is 
announced, it is expected that Russia will gain their concession.  In light of this evidence, it is 
safe to conclude that the third hypothesis is viable in explaining the actions of Russia. 
Security 
 The last hypothesis for this particular case study involves security.  Scholars have argued 
that security is the raison d’etre for alliance formation.  They hold that if a state feels that its 
security is threatened that they will balance with other states in an alliance to offset this security 
threat (Davis and Moore, 1997; Burg and Shoup, 1999).  This theory has been incorporated into 
this analysis in order to examine if it is a reasonable factor in explaining why Russia decided to 
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back the offshore drilling claims of the Republic of Cyprus.  In order to prove that this is a 
reasonable hypothesis, certain conditions have to be met.  The first is that Russia and Cyprus 
view the actions of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as threatening to their 
security.  The second condition that must be met is to show that Russia has acted upon this 
threat.  If both of these conditions are present, then this hypothesis is a valid explanation. 
 As demonstrated in the previous case studies, the Republic of Cyprus does indeed view 
the actions of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as threatening to their 
security.  They feel that these two countries are stealing their energy which they need in order to 
feel secure.  This was demonstrated in the statement to the Daily Hurriyet:  Turkey, “ha[s] 
suggested that Turkish Cypriots …… be given a full 50 percent share in any find off the island” 
(Kanli, 2011).  By diverting these hydrocarbons away from their consumption, the actions of 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots force Cyprus to rely on others for their hydrocarbons.  According 
to the Republic of Cyprus official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement to Today’s 
Zaman “[i]t cannot in any way be associated with the self-evident sovereign right of the Republic 
of Cyprus to move forward and utilize its natural resources” (Kumova, 2011).  The scholarly 
articles of Ker-Lindsay and Webb along with Faustmann and Kaymak, demonstrate that the 
larger Turkish military force on the island has led to apprehension  that this force will be used to 
conquer the Republic of Cyprus and assimilate them into the Republic of Turkey (Ker-Lindsay 
and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008).  These statements, along with the studies 
regarding the effects of the Turkish military on Cyprus, have led to the conclusion that the 
Republic of Cyprus is facing a security threat.   
What about Russia?  Russia also sees the actions of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus as threatening.  This is evident by the speeches given by Russian officials to 
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Pravda and to Hurriyet.  The following came from the Daily Hurriyet, "[Greek] Cyprus is 
effectively the offshore financial services center for Russia," said Chris Weafer, chief strategist 
at Russia's UralSib investment bank.”  The piece builds off this statement by showing how 
Turkey’s policies in the region have upset Russia’s commercial interests (Hurriyet, 2011).  This 
shows that Turkey’s actions are detrimental to the economic interests of Russia.  In the military 
realm, Russia views the presence of the Turkish navy in this dispute, to be threatening to their 
interests.  In the Cyprus News Report, it was claimed that Russia sent two submarines to protect 
the drilling platforms from Turkish interference (Fenwick, 2011).  In an interview with Pravda, 
Russian President Medvedev stated that “the actions of NATO” (i.e. Turkey) has not 
successfully solved the Cyprus issue”, therefore in order to stabilize the region, Russia is going 
to take a more prominent role (Pravda, 2011).  Due to the evidence analyzed, it is safe to 
conclude that the first condition has been met. 
 In order for the second condition to be met, it must be demonstrated that Russia has acted 
to preserve the stability of the region and to protect the Republic of Cyprus.  Examining the data, 
this condition is upheld.  The Russians have used diplomacy in order to protect the interests of 
the Republic of Cyprus (Pravda, 2011; Fenwick, 2011).  The Russians have also ordered two 
submarines and their sole aircraft carrier fleet to protect the offshore drilling of the Republic of 
Cyprus from the Turkish navy (Fenwick, 2011; Hurriyet, 2011).  Since Russia has used the 
available tools at its disposal (diplomatic and military) and has acted upon those tools, the second 
condition has also been met. 
 The fourth hypothesis holds that the security dilemma can be responsible for the 
formation of alliances.  In order for this hypothesis to be a valid explanation for this case study, 
two conditions had to be met.  The first condition holds that Russia and the Republic of Cyprus 
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both faced a security dilemma based on this crisis.  The interviews, scholarly reports, and 
historical evidence that have been analyzed support this claim.  The second condition holds that 
Russia had to act on these concerns to protect its own security, and that the Republic of Cyprus 
had asked for this support.  The statements from Pravda, Hurriyet, and Cyprus News were 
examined and it was found to support this condition.  As a result of both of the conditions being 
met, it is safe to conclude that the security hypothesis is a plausible explanation as to why Russia 
supported the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. 
Conclusion 
 During the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis, Russia ordered its aircraft carrier battle group 
to defend the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill off its coast (Fenwick, 2011; Hurriyet, 
2011).  This begs the question, why did Russia side with the Republic of Cyprus?  The answer 
was found by testing the four hypothesis of the analysis.  The data did not support the first 
hypothesis since the two states are comprised of different ethnicities.  At first the second 
hypothesis appeared to present a problem.  However, the elite factor ended up providing support 
that the second hypothesis is viable in explaining this case study.  While the second condition 
presented a problem for the third hypothesis, the other three ended up showing that hydrocarbon 
trade is a viable explanation.  Finally, the fourth hypothesis was tested.  The data examined and 
analyzed also shows that this hypothesis is viable in explaining why Russia allied with the 
Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. See table 5 for a summary of the 
findings for the case of Russia. 
II. Israel 
Like Russia, Israel is new to the scene of the Cyprus conflict.  Historically the states of 
Israel and the Republic of Cyprus have had less than cordial relations.  This is due to the Israel’s 
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traditional alliance with Turkey, the rival of the Republic of Cyprus.  The Republic of Cyprus, as 
a result, has taken a more sympathetic stance towards the cause of the Palestinians (Sharon, 
2011; Jerusalem Post, 2011).  However, due to the worsening ties with Turkey (more on this 
later), Israel has become friendlier towards the Republic of Cyprus and the feeling of good will 
has been reciprocated.  During the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis, Israel has offered its navy and 
its air force to the Republic of Cyprus to protect their right to exploit their offshore hydrocarbons 
(Jerusalem Post, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011).  Like the previous case studies before it, the 
question must be asked, why did Israel ally itself with the Republic of Cyprus during the 
offshore drilling crisis?  The answer may be found by testing the four hypotheses of this analysis. 
Ethnicity 
 As has been pointed out previously in this analysis, ethnicity is a critical component in 
determining what causes alliance formations between two states.  Scholars have argued ethnicity 
causes alliances to form due to a shared ethnic background.  Therefore, one ethnic state will 
come to the defense of a sister ethnic state (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997).  Since this 
is a critical component included in the previous literature, it would be remiss to not include this 
variable in the analysis of this particular case study.  In order for this hypothesis to be a viable 
explanation of why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, 
two conditions need to be met.  The first condition that needs to be met is to determine if Israel 
and the Republic of Cyprus are ethnically similar.  If they are, then the analysis can proceed to 
condition two.  If there is not an ethnic similarity, then it is imperative to establish other types of 
ethnic ties (i.e. minority groups, ethnic lobbies, etc.).  If the first condition is met, then the 
second condition will be examined.  If there is evidence that Israel supported the Republic of 
Cyprus due to ethnic considerations, then the first hypothesis will be validated. 
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 The first task is determining if the first condition is present in this case study.  Ethnic 
composition data will be examined to determine if there is ethnic similarity between the two 
states.  According to the census data available from the Central Intelligence Agency, in the 
Republic of Cyprus, 97% of the population belongs to the Greek ethnic group.  In Israel, 76.4% 
of the population belongs to the Jewish ethnic group (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  This data 
demonstrates that neither state shares the same dominant ethnic group.  Next, it is important to 
test if there are small pockets of ethnic exclaves of the other ethnic group located in each 
country.  According to the census data from the Rabbinate of Cyprus, there are only 350 Jewish 
families living in the Republic of Cyprus (Rabbinate of Cyprus, 2012).  The implication of this 
small number means that the Jews living on Cyprus do not have the political power to influence 
Cypriot policy.  According to the data from Central Intelligence Agency, in Israel 23.6% of the 
population belongs to an ethnic group that is different from the Jews.  Most of these are Arabs 
(CIA World Factbook, 2011).  The number of Greeks residing in Israel is too small to allow them 
to politically organize and influence Israel’s policy towards the Republic of Cyprus.  Therefore, 
support for the first condition is not present.   
This is not to say that ethnic lobbies do not have an impact (Burstein and Linton, 2002; 
Lohmann, 1998).  In order to test this idea, an internet search of the major search engines, 
LexisNexis, and the major news media was conducted.   However, no Greek Cypriot ethnic 
lobby could be found in Israel.  However, the search did demonstrate that there is a type of 
Jewish lobby on the Republic of Cyprus.  It is the Rabbinate of Cyprus.  However, this lobby 
deals primarily with ensuring that the religious rights of the Jews on the island are protected 
(Rabbinate of Cyprus, 2011).  Since it has not been active in the realm of improving relations 
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between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, there is no connection suggesting that this lobby was 
responsible for Israel aligning with the Republic of Cyprus during this particular crisis.   
The first hypothesis tested in this case study held that due to similar ethnic identification, 
an alliance between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus was bound to occur.  For this hypothesis 
to be viable, two conditions had to be met.  The first condition was identifying an ethnic link 
between the two countries.  The census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Rabbinate of Cyprus showed that this was not the case.  While there was an expectation that the 
ethnic lobby of the Rabbinate of Cyprus could explain the ties between the two countries, no 
evidence could be found to support the claim.  Based on the data analyzed and the evidence 
presented, it is safe to conclude that the first hypothesis is not a viable explanation as to why 
Israel allied itself with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis and may be 
dismissed. 
Religion 
 As the literature review and previous case studies in this analysis have shown, religion 
can be a useful explanatory variable in explaining why alliances form.  This variable has been 
included in this analysis via hypothesis two.  In order for this hypothesis to hold true in this 
particular case, several conditions have to be met.  The first condition is demonstrating that the 
two states adhere to the same religion.  The second condition is that religion plays an important 
aspect in the political scene.  Finally, the cause of the alliance must be justified on the grounds of 
religion.  If the last condition is met, then the second hypothesis holds promise in explaining the 
actions of Israel towards the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. 
 In order to test the first condition, it must be demonstrated that the religions of the two 
states are identical.  According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
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religion of the Republic of Cyprus is Greek Orthodox (96%), while the dominant religion of the 
state of Israel is Judaism (75.6%) (CIA World Factbook, 2011).  Taken at face value, the first 
condition appears to be problematic.  However, it is imperative to establish if there are any 
Orthodox Christians in Israel and if there are any Jews in Cyprus.  According to the religious 
data from the Rabbinate of Cyprus, the number of practicing Jews in Cyprus is about 350 
families (Rabbinate of Cyprus, 2011).  According to the Central Intelligence Agency the 
religious data for Israel shows that around 1% of the population adheres to the Orthodox Church 
(CIA World Factbook, 2011).  This is not a promising bit of information since the Christians in 
Israel are mainly Arab and relations between the two have not been good (Peled, 1992).   
 Even though the first condition is problematic, the other two conditions will still be 
tested.  The second condition holds that religion holds a prominent place of policymaking of the 
two states.  In order to determine if this is true, it is imperative to demonstrate high levels of 
religion in both countries, and that it holds steady or increases (not decrease) over a period of ten 
years.  This demonstrates how often political leaders use religion to justify their policies.  
According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the level of adherence to 
Orthodoxy in the Republic of Cyprus has held steady at 96% during the ten year period.  In 
Israel, 80.1% of the population adhered to Judaism in 2000 and 2.1% adhered to a Christian 
belief.  This has dropped to 75.6% and 2% respectively (CIA World Factbook, 2000; CIA World 
Factbook, 2011).  Based on this data it appears that the second condition is not viable.  But by 
examining the role of religion in the two societies, a different picture emerges.  Religion plays an 
important role in the politics of the Republic of Cyprus.  According to the Journal on Democracy 
and the European Commission, there is a strong tie between the church and state (Stepan, 2000; 
European Commission, 2005).  The same is true in Israel according to articles published in the 
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Journal of Politics and Jewish History.  Parties dominated by religious Jews ensure that at least 
some Israeli policies are favorable towards their religious objectives (Akzin, 1955; Bartal, 2006).  
Based on this evidence, it appears that the second condition has been met. 
 The third condition that must be met in order for this second hypothesis to be viable is 
demonstrating that religion is responsible for the informal alliance between Israel and the 
Republic of Cyprus.  There is evidence of a religious alliance between the two states.  According 
to an article in the Jerusalem Post, the agreement between the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the 
Jewish leaders have allowed the two states to strengthen their alliance by dealing with any 
problems that might arise between the two (Sharon, 2011; Rabbinate of Cyprus, 2012), this 
occurred after the offshore drilling crisis.  Since this factor occurred after the warming of 
relations, this hypothesis is not applicable.   
 This section of the case study set out to test the viability of the second/religious 
hypothesis.  It was determined that if this hypothesis was to be viable, it had to meet three 
conditions.  Those conditions were religious similarity, religious influence in politics, and 
religion be cited as a justification for the informal alliance between Israel and the Republic of 
Cyprus.  All three of the conditions were then tested.  The first condition was an issue as was the 
first half of the second condition.  However, the second half of the second condition was upheld 
by the existing data.  Despite this promising find, no concrete evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that religion was responsible for the alliance between Israel and the Republic of 
Cyprus.  Therefore, it is safe to conclude from the analysis that the second hypothesis does not 
explain why Israel defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to extract its offshore 
hydrocarbons. 
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Hydrocarbons 
 From the evidence presented so far, it appears that the culture aspect of the theory has not 
explained Israel’s actions.  Therefore, it is up to the non-culture aspect of the theory to explain 
the case of Israel.  Scholars have argued that a resource rich state can entice a resource poor state 
into forming an alliance by promising the resource poor state a share of the resources (Gowa and 
Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).  In order for this 
hypothesis to be a viable explanation in explaining the informal alliance between Israel and the 
Republic of Cyprus, two conditions have to be met.  The first condition needs to demonstrate the 
Republic of Cyprus is hydrocarbon rich and the state of Israel is hydrocarbon poor.  The second 
condition is demonstrating there is a transfer of hydrocarbons from the Republic of Cyprus to the 
state of Israel in exchange for Israel’s assistance in defending the Republic of Cyprus’ drilling 
platforms.  If both of these conditions are present, then the third hypothesis is viable. 
 First it is important to test and see if the first condition is present.  The first part of the 
condition holds that the Republic of Cyprus must have enough hydrocarbons to satisfy its own 
domestic needs, and have enough left over to entice international powers to support their cause.  
The geologic evidence provided to the British Broadcasting Company, Jerusalem Post, and 
Defence Greece demonstrates that the 7 trillion cubic feet of estimated reserves is enough to 
satisfy both conditions (BBC, 2011; Jerusalem Post, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011).  The second 
part of the condition holds that Israel must be energy dependent in order for the third hypothesis 
to be a viable explanation.  The evidence states otherwise.  Israel has discovered a large oil and 
natural gas field (dubbed Leviathan) off its Mediterranean coast (see figure 4).  Geological 
estimates from Helman, Bronner, and AFP shows that Leviathan has 25 million cubic feet of 
natural gas reserves (Helman, 2010; Bronner, 2010; AFP, 2010).  The result of this discovery in 
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Israel has enormous ramifications.  For the first time in its history, Israel is hydrocarbon 
independent.  They do not have to rely on hydrocarbons from the hostile states of the Middle 
East.  Nor do they have to worry about the logistics of importing their hydrocarbons from Russia 
and the Caspian region (Helman, 2010; Jerusalem Post, 2011).  However, since Israel is not a 
signatory to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, its legal claim to these 
Mediterranean hydrocarbons is in doubt.  This is especially true since Lebanon is a signatory to 
the treaty, and as a result has more legitimacy to these gas fields than Israel (U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Seas, 1982; Ungerleider, 2010; Karam, 2010).  While Israel is hydrocarbon 
independent, it faces a threat that undermines that security.  This concept will be given further 
consideration in the security section.  
 The second condition holds that the Republic of Cyprus will grant drilling concessions 
(or promise energy exports) to Israel in return for their support.  Conducting a search using the 
main internet search engines, one could not find any news articles that would support this 
condition.  The LexisNexis database was also searched to see if there were any newspaper 
articles that dealt with concessions or potential export of Cypriot energy to Israel.  Unfortunately, 
no articles were found to substantiate this condition.  Due to the problems associated with the 
first condition, combined with the lack of news media and policy statements to support the 
second condition, it is safe to conclude that the third hypothesis is not a viable explanation for 
this particular case study. 
 The third hypothesis of the analysis holds that a resource rich Republic of Cyprus would 
use its resource wealth to entice a resource poor Israel into forming an informal alliance.  In 
order for this hypothesis to be viable, two conditions had to be met.  The first condition was to 
demonstrate that the Republic of Cyprus was hydrocarbon rich and Israel was hydrocarbon poor.  
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The data shows that indeed the Republic of Cyprus is rich in hydrocarbons, but the data also 
shows that Israel is as well.  This makes the first condition problematic.  The second condition 
holds that there will be drilling concessions or energy exports to Israel in return for their support 
of the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.  The data shows that the evidence is 
lacking to support this condition.  Therefore, the third hypothesis is not viable for the purposes of 
this case study.  However, hydrocarbons do play a significant role in the security issues faced by 
both states. 
Security 
 Since the previous three hypotheses have been discounted in this particular case study 
analysis, it is up to the final hypothesis to shed light on why Israel chose to support the Republic 
of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.  Scholars have argued that the pre-eminent 
cause of alliance formation is rooted in security concerns.  States join in alliances to balance 
external threats, thereby improving their own security situation (Walt, 1985; Smith, 1995; 
Sorokin, 1994a; Axelrod et al; 1995; Sorokin, 1994b).  Certain conditions need to be met for this 
hypothesis to be a viable explanation.  The first condition is to demonstrate that both states face 
security threats.  The second condition is to demonstrate that the two states can work together to 
alleviate their security threat.  The third, and most important, condition is to demonstrate that the 
two states have enacted policies to protect their security.  If all these conditions are met, then the 
fourth hypothesis is a viable explanation as to why Israel allied with the Republic of Cyprus 
during the offshore drilling crisis. 
 First off the data will be examined to see if there is any support for the first condition.  
The first half of the first condition states that the Republic of Cyprus must be facing a security 
threat.  This was demonstrated in the statement to the Daily Hurriyet:  Turkey, “ha[s] suggested 
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that Turkish Cypriots …… be given a full 50 percent share in any find off the island” (Kanli, 
2011).  By diverting these hydrocarbons away from their consumption, the actions of Turkey and 
Turkish Cypriots force Cyprus to rely on other for their hydrocarbons.  According to the 
Republic of Cyprus official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement to Today’s Zaman 
“[i]t cannot in any way be associated with the self-evident sovereign right of the Republic of 
Cyprus to move forward and utilize its natural resources” (Kumova, 2011).  The scholarly 
articles of Ker-Lindsay and Webb along with Faustmann and Kaymak, demonstrates that the 
larger Turkish military force on the island, has led to apprehension from the Republic of Cyprus 
that this force will be used to conquer their state and assimilate them into the Republic of Turkey 
(Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008).  These statements, along with 
the studies regarding the effects of the Turkish military on Cyprus, have led to the conclusion 
that the Republic of Cyprus is in fact facing a security threat.   
The second part of the first condition holds that Israel must also face the same security 
threat.  This common enemy facilitates the formation of an alliance.  As shown by figure 4, the 
Leviathan energy field lies close to the border with Lebanon.  Lebanon, controlled by Hezbollah, 
has threatened Israel’s hold on these energy deposits.  Lebanon’s claims are bolstered because 
they are in fact signatories to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas.  This 
demarcates their Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 nautical miles.  Coincidently, this covers the 
Leviathan natural gas field that Israel claims.  Israel is not a signatory to the treaty, so this means 
that their claim to this natural gas field lacks legitimacy (U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Seas, 1982).  This is complicated since the claims of Hezbollah/Lebanon are backed by the 
government of Turkey (Ungerleider, 2010; Karam, 2011).  While Israel and Turkey have enjoyed 
warm relations in the past, the Gaza flotilla incident has soured those relations (Jerusalem Post, 
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2011).  According to the British Broadcasting Company “Turkey rejected that deal [with the 
Republic of Cyprus and Israel], because it does not recognise the Greek Cypriot government” 
(BBC, 2011).  The evidence presented demonstrates that both Israel and the Republic of Cyprus 
have a common enemy in Turkey. 
 While the first condition has been supported by the data, it is now time to examine if 
there is evidence to support the second condition.  The second condition needs to show that the 
two states are willing to work together in order to alleviate this common threat.  As with the first 
condition, this one also has two parts.  One part deals with the Republic of Cyprus and the other 
with the state of Israel.  For part one to have support, there must be evidence to show that the 
Republic of Cyprus has sought the support of the state of Israel vis-à-vis Turkey.  Statements 
made by the Republic of Cyprus back this claim.  According to UPI, "Cyprus and Greece had 
had indifferent ties with Israel but a compelling commonality of interests is sailing into view. A 
realignment of regional powers is taking place in the eastern Mediterranean, the leitmotif being 
the 'containment' of an increasingly assertive Turkey" (UPI, 2011).  According to Defence 
Greece, the Republic of Cyprus sees the utility of Israel’s military in protecting their offshore 
hydrocarbons from Turkish interference (Defence Greece, 2011b).  This shows that the Republic 
of Cyprus is willing to seek the aid of Israel to protect their offshore hydrocarbon discovery.   
The second part of the condition is that Israel recognizes that it needs the support of the 
Republic of Cyprus.  Since the row with Turkey over the Gaza flotilla incident, and Turkey’s 
resultant hostility towards Israel’s as projects in the Mediterranean, Israel needs outside support 
to defend its drilling claims.  Since Block 12 lies next to the Leviathan energy fields (see figures 
2 and 4), the Republic of Cyprus has presented itself as an ally to defend Israel’s energy claims 
from foreign interference.  Statements made to UPI, Jerusalem Post, and the Middle East 
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Quarterly by the government of Israel, all mention the need of Israel to have Cyprus’ support in 
securing their title to the Leviathan natural gas field.  “The agreement reached by Israel and 
Cyprus in 2010 delineating their maritime boundaries and their respective exclusive economic 
zones, and saying that beginning work to extract the gas should be done quickly “for the benefit 
of both sides” (UPI, 2011; Keinon, 2010; Inbar and Sandler, 2001; Jerusalem Post, 2011).  From 
the interviews and news sources analyzed in this section, it appears that there is evidence to 
support the second condition as well. 
 Finally, since the other two conditions are present, it is time to test the third and final 
condition.  This condition holds that the two states have enacted policies meant to bolster the 
security of the other state in regards to Turkey.  Again, this condition proceeds in two parts.  One 
part deals with the Republic of Cyprus and the other deals with the state of Israel.  In regards to 
the first part of the condition, the evidence supports its claim.  The Foreign Minister of the 
Republic of Cyprus has made the following statement to UPI and the Jerusalem Post:  “With her 
country locked in a nasty tiff with Turkey over maritime gas exploration rights, Cypriot Foreign 
Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis came to Israel Wednesday looking for signs of support on 
the matter from Jerusalem, and received it in the form of statement put out by the Prime 
Minister’s Office” (UPI, 2011; Jerusalem Post, 2011; Keinon, 2010).  This demonstrates that the 
government of Cyprus has asked for an alliance with Israel in order to protect their offshore 
hydrocarbons, and they have received it.   
For the part of Israel, the evidence suggests that the third condition holds in this case as 
well.  Israel has defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill and exploit its own offshore 
resources without international interference.  This was evidenced by the following quote made to 
the Jerusalem Post: The Republic of Cypriot Foreign Minister came asking for support for their 
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offshore drilling and “received it in the form of statement put out by the Prime Minister’s Office” 
(Jerusalem Post, 2011).   Israel has also offered to open an air base on the island so that its air 
force can protect the Republic of Cyprus from Turkish threats.  According to reports made by 
both Defence Greece and Debkafile, “Israel asked the Cypriot permission to use the ‘Andreas 
Papandreou’ in order to protect the offshore hydrocarbons of both the Republic of Cyprus and 
Greece from Turkish interference” (Defence Greece, 2011a; Defence Greece, 2011b; Debkafile, 
2011).  From the data provided by these news sources, it is clear that the third condition has been 
met.     
The fourth hypothesis of this analysis holds that by facing a common security threat, 
Israel and the Republic of Cyprus will join into an alliance in order to secure their own security 
interests.  In order for this hypothesis to be viable, three conditions had to be met.  The first 
condition was to demonstrate that both Israel and the Republic of Cyprus face a common 
security threat.  The data shows that both of these states share a common security threat 
manifested by the policies of the Republic of Turkey.  The second condition holds that there 
must be a willingness on both the part of the Republic of Cyprus and on the part of the state of 
Israel to work together to alleviate this common security threat.  The data examined and analyzed 
shows that the two states are pursuing policies in conjunction with one another in order to 
minimize the security threat emanating from Turkey.  Finally, there must be support that the two 
states have implemented policies to help bolster the security of the other state.  The data 
presented in this section also shows that this is the case.  It is safe to conclude that the security 
hypothesis is viable for explaining why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the 
Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.       
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Conclusion 
 Israel has sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis between 
the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  Israel has offered its air 
force and its navy to help secure the drilling platforms of the Republic of Cyprus and safeguard 
them from possible Turkish interference (Defence Greece, 2011a; Jerusalem Post, 2011; 
Debkafile, 2011).  This, of course, begs the question, why did Israel choose to ally with the 
Republic of Cyprus?  The answer was found by testing the four hypotheses of the analysis.  The 
first hypothesis presented problems and while the second hypothesis did have some support, it 
was difficult to determine if a religious alliance between the two was a cause or an effect.  The 
evidence was not there to support the third hypothesis, though the hydrocarbon trade did play a 
significant part in the final hypothesis.  Finally, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was 
tested.  The data supports that this hypothesis was a valid explanation as to why Israel sided with 
the Republic of Cyprus during this crisis.  As a result of these tests, it is concluded that the fourth 
hypothesis is the explanation for why Israel defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to 
exploit its own offshore energy resources.  See table 6 for a summary of the findings for the case 
of Israel. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
The Conclusion 
 
 On September 18, 2011, the Republic of Cyprus began offshore drilling in conjunction 
with Noble Energy (BBC, 2011).  This decision quickly escalated into an offshore drilling crisis 
that involved four international actors.  Moments after the drilling commenced off the coast of 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus granted drilling concessions to 
the Republic of Turkey.  The Turkish government then sent a naval team into the disputed waters 
to explore and extract the hydrocarbons (Al Jazeera, 2011).  Turkey’s actions led to responses by 
both Israel and Russia.  Israel backs the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill off their waters 
for hydrocarbons.  They have even offered to send their air force to protect the Republic of 
Cyprus (Jerusalem Post, 2011; Defence Greece, 2011a).  This has led to repeated harassment 
between the Turkish navy and the Israeli navy and air force (Debkafile, 2011; Today’s Zaman, 
2011a).  Russia has also entered the fray supporting the Republic of Cyprus.  Russia has sent two 
submarines and their lone aircraft carrier battle group to support the claims of the Republic of 
Cyprus (Fenwick, 2011; Hurriyet, 2011). One of the questions posed to both academics and 
policy makers is:  What factors caused the states to ally the way they did? The purpose of this 
analysis was to answer that question. 
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The literature examined has offered several different explanations as to why alliances 
form.  One theory holds that a state will come to the aid of its fellow ethnic state when that state 
is facing an external threat (Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004).  Another theory holds that 
religious similarity between two states explains alliance formation.  These scholars contend that 
a state will protect its fellow adherent from domination from an alien religion (Lewis, 1998; De 
Juan, 2009).  The third theory deals with natural resources.  According to this mode of thought, a 
resource rich state will use its abundant resources to entice a resource poor state into forming an 
alliance (Long, 2003; Long and Leeds, 2006; Fordham, 2010; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa 
and Mansfield, 2004).  The final theory, that underlies many of the previous theories, is security.  
If a state is threatened, then it will form an alliance in order to offset this security threat (Walt, 
1987; Sorokin, 1994a; Rozmer, 2008).   
 While each of these theories has made significant contributions to the field of alliance 
study, there is one major drawback.  These theories usually claim that their factor is the 
predominant explanation for alliance formation.  This precludes both scholars and academics 
from seeing the full picture.  As such, a theory was proposed that covered all these approaches.  
It included a culture section to include the first two theories (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009; 
Lebow, 2008).  The last two theories were incorporated under the non-culture half of the theory 
(Zweig, 1995; Walt, 1985).  Each traditional theory was then translated into a hypothesis.  Each 
of these four hypotheses was tested in a qualitative analysis.  The test was carried out using the 
case studies of the countries involved in the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.  Data was gleaned 
from historical sources, newspapers, secondary interviews, geological surveys, and academic 
journal articles.  The results were unique to each case study. 
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   The first case study of the empirical analysis focused on Great Britain.  The question 
was why did Great Britain side with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling 
crisis?  The answer was found by testing four hypotheses.  At first glance the ethnic hypothesis 
was not viable since the ethnic makeup of the two states is not similar.  However, the hypothesis 
was validated when the impact of the Cypriot interest groups was accounted for.  The religion 
hypothesis was supported in explaining the relations between the two states at the beginning.  
However, due to secularization in Great Britain, this hypothesis could not be supported by the 
data.  The hydrocarbon trade hypothesis held potential since energy rich Cyprus could buy the 
support of energy poor Great Britain.  Ultimately, there was no data to support this hypothesis 
either, though the results of the second offshore concession could validate the hypothesis.  As 
with the second and third hypotheses, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was a 
satisfactory explanation for relations between Cyprus and Great Britain from 1878 until 1974.  
However, the results of the 1974 invasion, ensuring the withdrawal of the Turkish military and 
budgetary problems demonstrates that in the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis, security played a 
negligible role.  The analysis of this section supports the role of ethnicity, in the form of interest 
groups, in explaining the alignment of Great Britain with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 
Cypriot drilling crisis. 
 This second study focused on the Hellenic Republic (i.e. Greece).  The empirical section 
answered why Greece sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.  The 
data supported the claim that ethnic similarity was responsible for Greece supporting the right of 
Cyprus to explore and exploit its offshore resources.  The data regarding the religious hypothesis 
provided support for the religious hypothesis also being viable in this case.  For the hydrocarbon 
trade hypothesis, the conditions are there to make it plausible as well.  However, it is too soon to 
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say with certainty that hydrocarbons are the reason Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus 
during the offshore drilling crisis.  Finally, the data found that the Republic of Cyprus’ security is 
threatened and they look to Greece for protection.  The Greek response has been mixed.  Greece 
has not provided military assistance to protect the Cypriot offshore drilling, but Greece has 
exerted diplomatic pressure on Turkey to protect its ally.  Therefore, the ethnic and religious 
hypotheses were the explanatory variables.  It is too soon for the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis to 
make a determination, and the security hypothesis was problematic. 
      The third case study answered the question of why Turkey sided with the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.  Four possible explanations were 
identified, incorporated into hypotheses, and tested.  The results supported the first hypothesis 
that ethnic similarities are responsible for the alliance.  Hypothesis three (hydrocarbon trade) and 
hypothesis four (security) was also validated by the data in this analysis.  However, there was 
insufficient evidence to support that hypothesis two (religion) is responsible for the alliance.  
Therefore, the reason for Turkey’s support of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during 
the offshore drilling crisis is found in ethnic similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security 
hypotheses. 
  During the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis, Russia ordered its aircraft carrier battle group 
to defend the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill off its coast (Fenwick, 2011; Hurriyet, 
2011).  This requires answering the question, why did Russia side with the Republic of Cyprus?  
Testing of the four hypotheses, revealed data which did not support the ethnic hypothesis since 
the two states are comprised of different ethnicities.  At first, the religion hypothesis appeared as 
if it would present problems.  However, the elite factor ended up providing support that the 
second hypothesis is viable in explaining this case study.  While the second condition was an 
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issue for the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis, the other three hypotheses showed that hydrocarbon 
trade is a viable explanation.  Finally, the security hypothesis was tested.  The data examined and 
analyzed also shows that this hypothesis is also a viable factor in explaining why Russia allied 
with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. 
 Israel has sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis between 
the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  Israel has offered its air 
force and its navy to help secure the drilling platforms of the Republic of Cyprus and safeguard 
them from possible Turkish interference (Defence Greece, 2011a; Jerusalem Post, 2011; 
Debkafile, 2011).  The question again must be posed, why did Israel choose to ally with the 
Republic of Cyprus?  The answer was found by testing the four hypotheses of the analysis.  The 
ethnic hypothesis was definitely problematic.  While the religious hypothesis did have some 
support, it was difficult to determine if a religious alliance between the two was a cause or an 
effect.  The evidence was not present to support the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis, though the 
hydrocarbons did play a significant part in the final hypothesis.  Finally, the fourth hypothesis 
dealing with security was tested.  The data supports that this hypothesis was definitely a viable 
explanation of why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during this crisis.  As a result of 
these tests, it is concluded that the fourth hypothesis is the explanation for why Israel defended 
the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit its own offshore hydrocarbon resources.     
This analysis has valuable contributions to make to both the policy making and academic 
fields.  The first contribution deals with the results.  The results from the case studies 
demonstrates that not one of the factors tested is solely responsible for explaining the formation 
of an alliance  It also shows that some of the factors are not even viable in explaining certain 
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variables.  This should serve as a warning to scholars that one theory cannot explain all global 
events.  
The second contribution deals with how other studies can build off this analysis.  The 
results of this analysis can be used to further the study of how ethnic conflicts can become 
internationalized.  The results are also important as they contribute to the existing scholarship 
dealing with the Cyprus conflict due to its inclusion of the recent offshore hydrocarbon find and 
the introduction of two new players (Russia and Israel).  Finally, the results can be translated into 
the study of geopolitics.  It will be interesting to see how offshore hydrocarbons and 
geographical location will affect the geopolitics of the region.  It was the intention of this project 
to help both policy makers and academics understand the factors at play during the recent 
Cypriot drama.  If this has been accomplished, then this project can be deemed a success.    
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Figure 2  Cypriot Offshore Hydrocarbons 
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Figure 3  British Bases 
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Figure 4 Leviathan Field 
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Tables 
 
Table 1  Data 
Factors Data Sources 
Ethnicity News Sources:  Al Jazeera; Famagusta Gazette; BBC; 
Cypriot Chronicle; Cyprus News Agency;  Greek Reporter; 
The National Herald  
Census:  North Cyprus; BBC; CIA World Factbook, 2011;  
Ethnic Groups of Europe:  An Encyclopedia; Population 
Census; Rabbinate of Cyprus; Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development; TRNC Info     
Journals:  Millennium:  Journal of International Studies; 
Third World Quarterly; Publius 
Historical:  Cyprus:  A Troubled Island; Cyprus; The Cyprus 
Issue:  A Documentary History, 1878-2008; Cyprus:  A 
Modern History; Treaty of Guarantee  
Religion News Sources:  Journal of Politics; Jewish History; The 
Daily Hurriyet; Greek Cypriot Daily; Pravda;  Jerusalem 
Post  
Census:  European Commission; CIA World Factbook, 2000; 
CIA World Factbook, 2011; Rabbinate of Cyprus   
Journals:  British Journal of Sociology; American Political 
Science Review; Third World Quarterly; Publius 
Historical:  Cyprus:  A Troubled Island;  Russia and Turkey; 
Cyprus; Cyprus:  A Modern History     
Other:  Freedom of Religion and Belief:  A World Report; 
Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye ‘nin Uluslararası Konumu; Cypriot 
Federation; The Making of Post-Christian Britain:  A History 
of the Secularization of Modern Society   
Hydrocarbons News Sources:  AFP; Asia News; Financial Times; BBC; 
New York Times; Globes; Forbes; USA Today; Time 
Magazine; Today’s Zaman; UPI    
Geological Reports: Energy Delta Institute; British 
Petroleum Cyprus; Cyprus Petroleum Refinery; The History 
of the British Petroleum Company;  Hellenic Petroleum; 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Motor Oil Hellas; Oil 
and Gas Security; The Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline:  Oil 
Window to the West; Well-Oiled Diplomacy:  Strategic 
Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in Eurasia   
Journals:  International Affairs; Fiscal Studies; Applied 
Energy; Insight Turkey; Eurasian Geography and Economics     
 
Security News Sources:  Al Jazeera; BBC; Debkafile; Defence 
Greece; Cyprus News Report; Cypriot Chronicle; The Daily 
Hurriyet; Jerusalem Post; Yahoo News; Front Page Mag; The 
Times;  The National Herald; Today’s Zaman; Fast 
Company; UPI       
Journals:  European Journal of Political Research; Third 
World Quarterly; Publius  
Historical:  Cyprus Convention;  Cyprus:  A Troubled Island;  
Cyprus; Cyprus:  A Modern History; Treaty of Guarantee 
 
  
118 
Table 2 Results:  Great Britain 
 
Hypothesis: Confirmed Potential Problematic 
Ethnicity X   
Religion   X 
Hydrocarbons  X  
Security   X 
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Table 3 Results:  Greece 
 
Hypothesis: Confirmed Potential Problematic 
Ethnicity X   
Religion X   
Hydrocarbons  X  
Security   X 
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Table 4 Results:  Turkey 
 
Hypothesis: Confirmed Potential Problematic 
Ethnicity X   
Religion   X 
Hydrocarbons X   
Security X   
 
 
 
  
121 
Table 5 Results:  Russia 
 
Hypothesis: Confirmed Potential Problematic 
Ethnicity   X 
Religion X   
Hydrocarbons X   
Security X   
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Table 6 Results:  Israel 
 
Hypothesis: Confirmed Potential Problematic 
Ethnicity   X 
Religion   X 
Hydrocarbons   X 
Security X   
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Figure 7 Results Summary 
 
Cases: Hypotheses 
 Ethnicity Religion Hydrocarbons Security 
Great Britain X    
Greece X X   
Turkey X  X X 
Russia  X X X 
Israel    X 
 
 
 VITA 
 
Gregory A. File 
 
Candidate for the Degree of 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Thesis:   ETHNICITY, RELIGION, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY:  THE 
CYPRIOT OFFSHORE DRILLING CRISIS 
 
 
 
Major Field:  Political Science 
 
Biographical: 
 
Education: 
 
Completed the requirements for the Master of Arts in Political Science at Oklahoma 
State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May, 2012. 
 
Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Science in Political Science at 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in 2010. 
 
Experience:   
File, Gregory A.  “The Deadly Siren of Liberal Economic Theory:  The Russo- 
     Georgian Conflicts.”  Presented at ISA Midwest.  November 12, 2012. 
  
 File, Gregory A. and Thomas Lassi.  “The Lost Grail:  Cultural Effects and the  
                 Attempts of Turkey to Join the E.U.”  Presented at ISA Midwest.  November  
                 11, 2012.     
 
Professional Memberships:  Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi Kappa Phi, Golden Key International 
Honor Society, National Society of Collegiate Scholars.  
 
 
 
 
 ADVISER’S APPROVAL:  Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel 
Name: Gregory A. File                                    Date of Degree: May, 2012 
 
Institution: Oklahoma State University  Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma 
 
Title of Study: ETHNICITY, RELIGION, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY:  THE 
CYPRIOT OFFSHORE DRILLING CRISIS 
 
Pages in Study: 123            Candidate for the Degree of Master of Arts 
Major Field: Political Science 
 
Scope and Method of Study:  Due to the limited time frame, small number of variables, and 
small number of cases utilized; a small-n qualitative case study approach was employed.  
The analysis employed a mixed methodology of content and historical analysis.  This 
allowed the researcher to examine the policy statements, speeches, and interviews of the 
governmental leaders (backed with historical, census, geological, and scholarly data) in 
order to understand why states aligned the way they did in this particular instance.  
 
Findings and Conclusions:   
 
On September 18, 2011, the Republic of Cyprus announced it had begun the process of 
extracting offshore hydrocarbons. The announcement sparked a crisis.  Great Britain, Greece, 
Russia and Israel voiced their support for the right of the Republic of Cyprus to recover their 
offshore hydrocarbon resources.  Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
and sent an exploration crew to the disputed waters to protect the claim of the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus.  This begs the question:  What factors are responsible for the formation of 
these alliances?  The answer is found by testing four hypotheses (ethnicity, religion, 
hydrocarbon trade, and security) under the mixed theory utilizing both cultural and non-cultural 
elements.  The hypotheses are tested using the five cases of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, 
Russia and Israel.  The results are mixed, since each case is unique.  Ethnicity explained the 
cases of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey.  Religion explained the cases of Russia and Greece.  
Hydrocarbon trade contributed to the explanation in the cases of Turkey and Russia.  Finally, 
the security hypothesis accounts for the cases of Turkey, Russia and Israel.  The findings of this 
study contribute to the existing literature regarding the Cypriot conflict by adding the new actors 
of Russia and Israel, along with the new dimension that deals with the discovery of 
hydrocarbons.  The findings can also contribute to the studies of internationalized ethnic conflict 
and geopolitics more generally.     
 
 
 
